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1. INTRODUCTION
"The right to equal protection of the laws, in the exercise of those freedoms of
speech and religionprotected by the First and FourteenthAmendments, has a
firmer foundation than the whims or personal opinions of a local governing
body. "I

Twelve years after the passage of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA" or the "Act"), there is little clarity available for practitioners or courts in applying the "nondiscrimination"
provision set forth in the Act:
NONDISCRIMINATION - No government shall impose or implement a land
use regulation that discriminates against any assembly or institution on the ba2
sis of religion or religious denomination.

While there is ample evidence of discrimination-both overt and surreptitious-violative of RLUIPA, some commentators continue to argue that
religious groups simply do not face discrimination during the land use regulation process and that stakeholders in such regulation are only concerned
with legitimate land use issues.3 They are plainly wrong. While there is no
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1 Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 272 (1951).
2 The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(2) (2006).
3 See, e.g., Stephen Clowney, Comment, An Empirical Look at Churches in the Zoning Process, 116
YALE L.J. 859, 863 (2007) ("[T]his Comment questions the prevailing belief that zoning 'has become
the most widespread obstacle to the free exercise of religion."'); Diane K. Hook, Comment, The Reli-

gious Land Use and InstitutionalizedPersons Act of 2000: Congress' New Tiist on "Speak Softly and
Carry a Big Stick," 34 URB. LAW. 829, 851 (2002) ("[I]t is difficult to accept that there is a pervasive
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question that local zoning boards and other regulatory bodies are often motivated by sincere concerns about matters such as traffic, environmental
protection, and adherence to building codes, it is also true that such reasons
are often used as a fagade for invidious discrimination.4 Also, it is far more
frequent that minority faiths and those that are unfamiliar to local residents
suffer from such intolerance.5
Land use regulation is a "highly individualized and discretionary process." 6 Zoning laws "often restrict.. .religious assemblies to designated districts and frequently require.. .that religious assemblies complete a conditional use application procedure."7 In such cases, a religious organization
seeking to construct a house of worship must meet with the approval of
government actors weighing very subjectives criteria, such as whether a
"proposed use or structure is in harmony with the general purpose and intent of [zoning] regulations" given the consideration of a list of factors, after which a necessary permit may be granted. 9 Similarly, procedures for
and widespread discrimination against religious entities attempting to build, buy, or rent adequate space
in which to exercise their faith."); Jess Bravin, Church Turns to Higher Authority in Zoning Battle,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 2011 (quoting Marci Hamilton) ("In cases like Boerne and San Leandro, 'there's
no
discrimination-it's
just
a
fight
over
zoning."'),
available
at
http://online.wsi.com/article/SB10001424052970204450804576623053812974230.html;
Marci Hamilton, The FederalGovernment 's Intervention on BehalfofReligious Entities in Local Land Use Disputes:
Why
It's
a
Terrible
Idea,
FINDLAW'S
WRIT
(Nov.
6,
2003),

http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/2003 1106.html. But see Matthew Baker, Comment, RLUIPA and
Eminent Domain: Probing the Boundaries ofReligious Land Use Protection, 2008 BYU L. REv. 1213,

1240 (2008) ("[m]ost of the criticism strikes at the fringes, and not at the heart, of the claims made during the congressional hearings.").
4 See, e.g., Bikur Cholim, Inc. v. Vill. of Suffern, 664 F. Supp. 2d 267, 282-84 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (member of the Zoning Board, which had unanimously denied a variance application, testified that "certain
explanations for the denial of the application included in the [explanation] were not the actual reasons
for the Zoning Board's decision.").
5 146 CONG. REC. S7774-01 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy).
6 Third Church of Christ v. City of New York, 617 F. Supp. 2d 201, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff d 626
F.3d 667 (2d Cir. 2010).
7 Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1227 (11th Cir. 2004).
8 Although outside the scope of this article, such criteria have been held to be unconstitutional prior restraints as they "invest excessive discretion in the hands of the land use board." See St. Benedict Ctr. v.
Town of Richmond, No 07-010, slip op. at 18, 2009 WL 8635926, at 7 (N.H. Super. Oct. 23, 2009) (on
file with authors); see also Hollywood Cmty. Synagogue, Inc. v. City of Hollywood, 436 F. Supp. 2d
1325, 1336 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (holding that the city's requirement that places of worship obtain a special
exception permit constituted a prior restraint because it lacked narrow, precise, and objective standards
to guide officials).

9 The zoning

regulations at issue in Hollyvood Community Synagogue, Inc. v. City ofHollyiwood, 436 F.

Supp. 2d 1325 (S.D. Fla. 2006) are illustrative. The statute provided that the zoning board may grant a
special permit "if it makes all of the following findings: (a) That the use is compatible with the existing
natural environment and other properties within the vicinity; (b) That there will be adequate provision
for safe traffic movement, both vehicular and pedestrian, both internal to the use and in the area which
will serve the use; (c) That there are adequate setbacks, buffering, and general amenities in order to control any adverse effects of noise, light, dust and other potential nuisances; and (d) That the land area is
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special permits,o variances," rezoningl2 or text amendments are also dis-

cretionary. 13 Municipalities may also pass ordinances targeted at pending
applications to ensure that disfavored worship facilities cannot be built.14
RLUIPA was designed not only to protect individuals and faith groups
that are targeted directly for their beliefs, but also as a shield for religious
groups suffering from crafty regulators and community opponents who
have learned to couch their opposition in more subtle terms. 15 It is "the latest of long-running congressional efforts to accord religious exercise
heightened protection from government-imposed burdens."16 Congress implemented RLUIPA as a response to the Supreme Court's decisions in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith7
and City of Boerne v. Flores, in which the Court held that Congress had

overstepped its authority when it enacted the Religious Freedom Restorasufficient, appropriate and adequate for the use as proposed." Id. at 1334. Even if an applicant was able
to obtain favorable findings for each of these broad categories, the zoning board could still impose conditions that "are necessary to further the purpose of the zoning district or compatibility with other property within the vicinity, or deny the special exception." Id. at 1334.
10 See Vision Church v. Vill. of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 990 (7th Cir. 2006) (discussing effect of
officials' discretion in issuing special use permits on zoning regulations).
11 See Shelton v. City of College Station, 754 F.2d 1251, 1258 (5th Cir. 1985) (discussing disputed factual issue of whether zoning officials were shielded from individual liability for discretionary function of
administering the city's zoning-variance policy).
12 See Jacobs, Visconsi & Jacobs, Co. v. City ofLawrence, 927 F.2d 1111, 1117 (10th Cir. 1991) ("The
classification of the rezoning application process as quasi-judicial by the Kansas Supreme Court, however, does not further appellants' expectation of a property interest or otherwise place substantive limitations on official discretion.").
13 See Richardson v. Twp. of Brady, 218 F.3d 508, 517 (6th Cir. 2000) ("If [Plaintiffs] claim is that he
was deprived of a text amendment or "interpretation" without due process, he cannot show that he has a
protected property interest in such an amendment. Simply put, [Plaintiff] can have no legitimate claim of
entitlement to a discretionary decision.").
14 See, e.g., Reaching Hearts Int'l, Inc. v. Prince George's Cnty., 584 F. Supp. 2d 766, 783 (D. Md.
2008), affd, 68 Fed. App'x 370 (4th Cir. 2010) (City Council passed new legislation less than two
months after denying group's application, which rendered it impossible for the group to construct a
church or school on its own property); Moxley v. Town of Walkersville, 601 F. Supp. 2d 648, 656 (D.
Md. 2009) (after a Muslim group announced plans to purchase land in an agricultural zone, the county
commissioners passed an ordinance excluding all houses of worship from the agricultural zone, even by
way of a special exception).
15 See 146 CONG. REC. S7774-01 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy) ("Churches in general, and new, small, or unfamiliar churches in particular, are frequently discriminated against on the face of zoning codes and also in the highly individualized and discretionary
processes of land use regulation."); Shelley Ross Saxer, Zoning Away First Amendment Rights, 53
WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 1, 8 n. 34 (1998) (noting that "[c]lashes between zoning authorities
and religious groups commonly have involved Jehovah's Witnesses, Orthodox Jews, and Hari Krishnas").
16 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 714 (2005). For a thorough history of the RLUIPA, see Roman P.
Storzer & Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., The Religious Land Use and InstitutionalizedPersonsAct of 2000:
A ConstitutionalResponse to UnconstitutionalZoning Practices, 9 GEO. MASON L. REv. 929, 931-44
(2001).
17 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
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tion Act of 1993 ("RFRA").18 RLUIPA has weathered judicial scrutiny
more successfully than RFRA; the Supreme Court held that the "institutionalized persons" provisions of RLUIPA19 were a constitutional exercise of
congressional power, 20 and the lower courts have unanimously upheld the
land use provisions.21
This article is divided into three parts. First, it explores certain issues inherent in a Nondiscrimination claim, including how the Nondiscrimination
provision has been mistakenly conflated with other RLUIPA land use provisions, whether a showing of direct hostility toward a particular faith by
governmental actors is required, and what might qualify as adequate comparators in a case where a claimant asserts that it was treated differently and
worse than similarly situated applicants. Second, the article proposes application of the reasoning in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green22 to some

Nondiscrimination claims. This would be achieved by burden shifting; after the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of dissimilar treatment, triggering a presumption of discrimination, the burden would shift to the defendant to show a nondiscriminatory motive for its actions. Finally, the
article provides different real-world examples and applies the suggested solution to the various contexts in which a Nondiscrimination claim arises.
II.

BACKGROUND AND APPLICATION OF

RLUIPA'S

NONDISCRIMINATION

PROVISION

RLUIPA's land use provisions23 set forth five grounds upon which a
cause of action may be based: a land use regulation that (1) substantially
burdens religious exercise without being the least restrictive means of
achieving a compelling governmental interest (the "Substantial Burdens"
provision);24 (2) treats a religious assembly or institution on less than equal
18 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534-36 (1997).
19 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq. (2006).
20 Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720.
21 See, e.g., World Outreach Conf. Ctr. v. City of Chi., 591 F.3d 531, 534 (7th Cir. 2009) (expressly
finding "substantial burden" provision constitutional); Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck,
504 F.3d 338, 354-56 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that RLUIPA does not violate either the Tenth Amendment or the Establishment Clause); Guru Nanak Sikh Soc'y of Yuba City v. Cnty. of Sutter, 456 F.3d
978, 981 (9th Cir. 2006) ("[W]e find the relevant portion of RLUIPA is a permissible exercise of Congress's remedial power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
22 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
23 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2006).
24 Id.

§ 2000cc(a)(1).

The Substantial Burdens provision is limited in application to circumstances in

which the substantial burden "is imposed in a program or activity that receives Federal financial assistance," where the substantial burden (or its removal) affects "commerce with foreign nations, among the
several States, or with Indian tribes," or where the substantial burden is "imposed in the implementation

2013]1

CIVIL RIGHTS AND RLITIPA

299

terms than a nonreligious assembly or institution (the "Equal Terms" provision); 25 (3) "discriminates against any assembly or institution on the basis of
religion or religious denomination" (the "Nondiscrimination" provision);26
(4) totally excludes religious assemblies from a jurisdiction (the "Total Exclusion" provision);27 or, (5) unreasonably limits religious assemblies within a jurisdiction (the "Unreasonable Limitations" provision).28 Significantly, one of RLUIPA's rules of construction provides that the statute "shall be
construed in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the [Act] and the Constitution."29
"Land use regulation" can mean either the zoning or landmarking laws to
which a plaintiff may be subject if using the property for religious exercise.30 RLUIPA applies to both the "impos[ition]" and "implement[ation]"
of a land use regulation.31 In practical terms, this provides a plaintiff with
the opportunity to challenge, for example, a burdensome law (e.g., a zoning
provision that requires a five acre minimum lot size to construct a place of
worship) or a burdensome application of a law (e.g., denial of a special use
permit to construct a place of worship because of a standardless determination by a zoning board that the lot was "too small" to house a place of worship).
While there is a developing standard of law for claims brought under
other provisions of RLUIPA, no prevailing standard has yet been adopted
for the Nondiscrimination provision. Furthermore, while RLUIPA was
passed in great part to overcome discrimination against minority faiths in
the zoning process, there are very few decisions regarding this provision.
No prevailing standards for pleading or proving a Nondiscrimination claim
have emerged, to the detriment of both religious groups who face discrimination in the same forms that have long been recognized in other civil rights
cases, and to local governments facing unknown liability for their unequal
treatment of religious land use applicants. Without a guiding standard,
courts and practitioners have treated this provision inconsistently.
of a land use regulation or system of land use regulations, under which a government makes, or has in
place formal or informal procedures or practices that permit the government to make, individualized
assessments
of the proposed uses for the property involved." Id. § 2000cc(a)(2).
25
Id § 2000cc(b)(1).
26 Id. § 2000cc(b)(2).
27 Id. § 2000cc(b)(3)(A).
28 Id. § 2000cc(b)(3)(B).
29 Id. § 2000cc-3(g).
30 See id. § 2000cc-5(7)(B) ("The use, building, or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious exercise shall be considered to be religious exercise of the person or entity that uses or intends to
use the property for that purpose.")
31 Id. § 2000cc(a)(1).
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A. Legislative History and Current Examples of Discrimination
The Department of Justice has recently reported that, since September
11, 2001, its Civil Rights Division has "opened more than 28 matters involving efforts to interfere with the construction of mosques and Islamic
centers." 32 One example of a story that is distressingly familiar to RLUIPA
practitioners is that of an Islamic group in Minnesota who sought approval
to construct a religious center. 33 Reportedly, the group worked with city officials for months and received approval from the city's Planning Commission, only to have the City Council reject their plans. 34 Along the way, the
group attended public hearings on its proposal, during which it had to hear
its religion called "evil" by members of the community.35
Congress considered evidence of such overt discrimination, as well as
more subtle forms, when it enacted RLUIPA.36 The Subcommittee on the
Constitution of the House Committee on the Judiciary conducted nine separate hearings, during which lawyers involved in these types of cases, researchers, and religious leaders provided testimony on the discrimination
faced by religious groups. 37 In its report, the Committee on the Judiciary
quoted one practitioner who testified that "[t]he result of these zoning patterns is to foreclose or limit new religious groups from moving into a municipality. Established houses of worship are protected and new houses of
worship and their worshipers are kept out." 3 8 The Committee also cited one
case where "a Mormon church was denied a permit to use property which
had formerly been used as a church."39 The location was near three other
large churches.40 After the Mormon church purchased the property and applied to use it, "[t]he city denied the permit on the basis that a temple would
not be 'in the best interests of and promote the public health, safety, morals,
convenience, order, prosperity, and general welfare of the City' and cit[ed]
its desire to have no more churches in the community."41
32 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CONFRONTING DISCRIMINATION IN THE POST-9/11 ERA:
CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNITIES
TEN
YEARS
LATER
3
(2011),
available
at

http://www.justice.gov/crt/publications/post9l /post9l1summit report 2012-04.pdf.
33 See Rose French, St. Anthony City Council Rejects Islamic Center Plan, MINN. STAR TRIBUNE, June
13, 2012, available at http://www.startribune.com/local/north/158785005.html
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 H.R. REP. No. 106-219, at 17 (1999).
3 H.R. REP. No. 106-219, at 17.
38 H.R. REP. No. 106-219, at 19.
39 H.R. REP. No. 106-219, at 22.
40 H.R. REP. No. 106-219, at 22.
41 H.R. REP. No. 106-219, at 22.
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RLUIPA was enacted against this backdrop, with broad, bi-partisan support. In the "Need for Legislation" section of the Joint Statement in support

of the bill, Senators Hatch and Kennedy cited "frequent discrimination"
faced by religious groups. 42 They noted that "[s]ometimes, zoning board
members or neighborhood residents explicitly offer race or religion as the
reason to exclude a proposed church, especially in cases of black churches
and Jewish shuls and synagogues."4 3 Further, "the codes permit churches
only with individualized permission from the zoning board, and zoning
boards use that authority in discriminatory ways."44
Courts have also recognized the "vulnerability of religious institutionsespecially those that are not affiliated with the mainstream Protestant sects
or the Roman Catholic Church-to subtle forms of discrimination when, as
in the case of the grant or denial of zoning variances, a state delegates essentially standardless discretion to nonprofessionals operating without procedural safeguards."45 One court reviewing the legislative history of
RLUIPA's land use provisions noted: "Congress compiled what it considered to be 'massive evidence' of widespread discrimination against religious institutions by state and local officials regarding land-use decisions,
and concluded that often these decisions frustrated a core aspect of religious
exercise - the ability to worship."46 In this context, there can be no doubt
about the existence of the discrimination that RLUIPA was intended to help
remedy.
In its report on the draft version of RLUIPA in the House of Representatives, the House Committee on the Judiciary discussed testimony regarding
a study "finding that Jews, small Christian denominations, and nondenominational churches are vastly over represented in reported church zoning cases."47 According to the study, "[r]eligious groups accounting for only 9%
of the population account for 50% of the reported litigation involving location of churches, and 34% of the reported litigation involving accessory uses at existing churches."48 Once unaffiliated and nondenominational
42 146 CONG. REC. S7774 (Jul. 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sens. Hatch and
Kennedy).
43 146 CONG. REC. S7774.
44 146 CONG. REC. S7774.
45 Sts. Constantine & Helen Greek Orthodox Church, Inc. v. City of New Berlin, 396 F.3d 895, 900 (7th
Cir. 2005).
46 Rocky Mtn. Christian Church v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Boulder Cnty., 612 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1185
D. Colo. 2009), affd, 613 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2010), cert denied, 131 S. Ct. 978 (2011).
H.R. REP. No. 106-219, at 20 (1999); see also Von G. Keetch & Matthew K. Richards, The Needfor
Legislationto Enshrine Free Exercise in the Land Use Context, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 725 (1999) (fur-

ther discussing the study referenced by the House Committee on the Judiciary).
48 H.R. REP. No. 106-219, at 21.
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churches are added, the figure swells to "69% of the reported location cases,
and 51% of the reported accessory use cases." 49 After reviewing the statistical and anecdotal data, the study's authors concluded that in the preRLUIPA world, "the current status of the law leaves no balance at all, vesting full decision-making power as to these land use matters in the hands of
locally elected officials and demoting the constitutionally protected right to
freely exercise religion."50
Muslims have suffered disproportionately from bias in zoning proceedings nationwide.51 In Albanian Associated Fund v. Township of Wayne, the

Township initiated condemnation proceedings against a Muslim group's
property purportedly based on environmental concerns, but made a deal to
accommodate a Catholic hospital situated on environmentally sensitive
land.52 In Moxley v. Town of Walkersville, a town commissioner was alleged to have conspired with local residents, advising them on how to best
oppose a Muslim group's zoning petition at public hearings, "including refraining from using 'terms like Muslim, those individuals, religion etc.,'
and how many people should testify."53 The Islamic Center of Murfreesboro was sued by neighbors seeking to block mosque construction and also
had to endure vandalism, arson, and bomb threats during the construction of
the mosque. 54 Orthodox Jews, Hindus, and other minority religions continue to raise claims under RLUIPA at a disproportionate rate.55

49

Id.

50 Keetch, supranote 47, at 734-35.
51 Eric Treene, RLUIPA and Mosques, Enforcing a FundamentalRight in Challenging Times, 10 FIRST

AMENDMENT L. REv. 330, 347-48 (2011) (Describing incidents of anti-Muslim hate crimes and noting,
"t]he anti-Muslim bias in cases [the Department of Justice] ha[s] handled is often overt.").
5 Albanian Associated Fund v. Twp. of Wayne Planning Bd., No. 06-cv-3217, 2007 WL 2904194, at
*11 (D.N.J. Oct. 1, 2007).
Moxley v. Town of Walkersville, 601 F. Supp. 2d 648, 654 (D. Md. 2009).
54 Robbie Brown & Christine Hauser, After a Struggle, Mosque Opens in Tennessee, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
10, 2012, at A9; Press Release, Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Mosque Free to Open, a Win for all
Religious Houses of Worship (Aug. 10, 2012), available at http://www.becketfund.org/tennesseemosque-opens-in-time-for-ramadan; see also Al Salaam Mosque Found. v. City of Palos Heights, No.
00-C-4596, 2001 WL 204772, at *2 (N.D. 111.Mar. 1, 2001) (The city frustrated a Muslim group seeking
to purchase existing church property by subjecting the group to worse treatment than others. Further,
the Zoning Committee "indicated to [the plaintiffs representative] that it was their opinion that a
mosque was not the same as a church and therefore, even if the special use ran with the land, it was possible that using the property as a mosque was not permitted.").
55 See LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 67 F.3d 412, 434-35 (2d Cir. 1995) (village's zoning code limiting the use of Orthodox rabbis' homes for prayer services was motivated by anti-Semitism); United
States v. Vill. of Airmont, No. 05-5520, slip op. at 2-4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2008) (Orthodox Jewish
group seeking to build a yeshiva challenged a village's complete ban on boarding schools); Reaching
Hearts Int'l Inc. v. Prince George's Cnty., 584 F. Supp. 2d 766, 772 (D. Md. 2008), aff'd, 68 Fed. Appx.
370 (4th Cir. 2010) (Seventh-Day Adventist group sought to build church); Adhi Parasakthi Charitable,
Med., Educ., & Cultural Soc'y of N. Am. v. Twp of W. Pikeland, 721 F. Supp. 2d 361, 869 (E.D. Pa.

2013]1

CIVIL RIGHTS AND RLITIPA

303

While successful challenges to targeted zoning actions tend to be litigated under the Substantial Burdens provision of RLUIPA, the decisions themselves clearly indicate that the treatment of these religious applicants was so
poor that the applications could have established prima facie Nondiscrimination claims. For example, in Westchester Day School, an Orthodox Jewish day school was forced to commence two separate RLUIPA lawsuits to
obtain the permit to build a gymnasium.56 The Second Circuit noted that
"[t]he arbitrary application of laws to religious organizations may reflect
bias or discrimination against religion."67 Similarly, in Guru Nanak Society
of Yuba City v. County of Sutter, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the religious

group's two denied applications and conditions imposed by the zoning
board, concluding "the history behind Guru Nanak's two CUP application
processes, and the reasons given for ultimately denying these applications,
to a significantly great extent lessened the possibility that future CUP applications would be successful."8 In Saints Constantine and Helen Greek Orthodox Church, Inc. v. City of New Berlin, the Seventh Circuit found that

"repeated legal errors made by the City's officials cast doubt on their good
faith."59 In FortressBible Church v. Feiner,"[g]iven the overwhelming evidence of Defendants' intentional delay, hostility, and bias toward the
Church's application, the Court finds that . . . the Church's religious exer-

cise was substantially burdened by the Town's arbitrary and unlawful denial
of its application."60

B. Problems with the Application of the Nondiscrimination Provision
Inconsistency of application and lack of concrete standards contribute to
the dearth of Nondiscrimination RLUIPA claims.61 Problems in its applica2010) (Hindu group sought to construct worship facility); Int'l Church of the Foursquare Gospel v. City
of San Leandro, 673 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2011) (Pentecostal church sought to construct worship facility);
Church of Scientology of Ga., Inc. v. City of Sandy Springs, Ga., 843 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1335 (N.D. Ga.
2012) (Scientologists sought to build worship and education center); Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of
Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 354 (2d Cir. 2007) (Orthodox Jewish school sought to build expansion);
Guru Nanak Sikh Soc'y of Yuba City v. Cnty. of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978, 981-82 (9th Cir. 2006) (Sikh
group sought to build worship facility); E. End Eruv Ass'n, Inc. v. Vill. of Westhampton Beach, 828 F.
Supp. 2d 526, 530 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (Orthodox Jewish group sought to construct eruv within Village).
56 Westchester Day Sch., 504 F.3d at 346.
57 Id. at 350.
58 Guru Nanak Sikh Soc y of Yuba City, 456 F.3d at 989.
59 Sts. Constantine & Helen Greek Orthodox Church v. City of New Berlin, 396 F.3d 895, 899 (7th Cir.
2005).
60 Fortress Bible Church v. Feiner, 734 F. Supp. 2d 409, 503 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
61 See Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 406 F. Supp. 2d 507, 516 (D.N.J.
2005), rev'd in part, 510 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2007).
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tion include both issues of statutory interpretation and more systemic problems with respect to the assumptions and standards used in applying the
statute. The Nondiscrimination provision "is even less clear than the meaning of the 'substantial burden' provision."62 Sometimes, the provision is inexplicably ignored outright.63
1. Conflating the Nondiscrimination and Equal Terms Provisions
RLUIPA contains two different provisions relating specifically to discriminatory laws or conduct: the Nondiscrimination and the Equal Terms

provisions. While the former addresses discrimination on the basis of religion or religious denomination,64 the latter speaks to unequal treatment between religious and nonreligious land uses. 65 Yet, the two provisions are
sometimes conflated. In one early case, the Seventh Circuit analyzed
whether church uses were treated differently from nonreligious uses under
the auspices of a Nondiscrimination claim.66 These types of claims are now
widely understood to fall under the Equal Terms provision.67 More recently, in Church of Scientology of Georgia v. City of Sandy Springs, the court

noted that "[t]he parties treat RLUIPA's Nondiscrimination provision as a
subset of the Equal Terms provision . . . ."68 Likewise, in Roman Catholic
Bishop of Springfield v. City of Springfield, the court observed that the
"[p]laintiff lumps this violation into the same count . . . as its Equal Terms

argument and makes no attempt to distinguish these provisions."69 Treating
the two sections as one violates the basic principles of statutory construction: the Equal Terms provision and Nondiscrimination provision are listed
separately. o The Seventh Circuit has recognized that "each of RLUIPA's
62 Guru Nanak Sikh Soc'y of Yuba City v. Cnty. of Sutter, 326 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1154 (E.D. Cal.
2003), affd, 456 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2006).
63 See, e.g., Great Lakes Soc'y v. Georgetown Charter Twp., 761 N.W. 2d 371, 389 n. 22 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2008) ("In response, GLS goes to great lengths to describe the religious hostility, animus, and discriminatory intent of various township officials. All of that argument applies to the decision that GLS is
not a church, however, so it is inapposite to this Court's review of GLS's claims that its constitutional
rights were violated with respect to the variance decision.").
64 42 U.S.C. §2000cc(b)(2) (2006).
65
1d. § 2000cc(b)(1) (2006).
66 Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chi., 342 F.3d 752, 762 (7th Cir. 2003).
67 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1).
68 Church of Scientology of Ga., Inc. v. City of Sandy Springs, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1360 (N.D. Ga.
2012).
69 Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield v. City of Springfield, 760 F. Supp. 2d 172, 191 (D. Mass.
2011).
70 See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 364 (2000) ("In light of the cardinal principle of statutory construction that courts must give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute, this Court must
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land-use subsections captures a distinct kind of free-exercise harm and must
be given its own force and effect."" Clarity as to the type of claims alleged
in a RLUIPA suit is necessary.

2. Conflating the Nondiscrimination and Substantial Burdens Provisions
Section 2000cc(a) of RLUIPA states:
(a) SUBSTANTIAL BURDENS(1) GENERAL RULE- No government shall impose or implement a land
use regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a religious assembly or institution,
unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on

that person, assembly. or institution-(A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and

(B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest. 72

Although the application of the Substantial Burdens provision has its
own set of pitfalls,73 it is beyond the scope of this article. One court has
recognized that "[c]ourts disagree over whether section 2000cc(b) is dependent on section 2000cc(a)."74
However, the structure of the statute clearly indicates that a Substantial
Burdens violation may occur even where a zoning law or its application is
neutral with respect to the religious entity, and a Nondiscrimination violation is subject to neither the "substantial burden" nor strict scrutiny analysis.76 For example, a zoning law that charged Christian churches $100 for a
give independent meaning to both [clauses of the statute at issue]."); United States v. Menasche, 348
U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955) ("It is our duty 'to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute,
rather than to emasculate an entire section.").
71 River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, Ill., 611 F.3d 367, 382 (7th Cir. 2010) (en
banc).
72 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1) (2006). Significantly, here interstate commerce is affected by the burden or
removal of the burden, the Substantial Burdens provision applies "even if the burden results from a rule
of general applicability; . . . ." § 2000cc(a)(2)(B).
7 See generally Jason Z. Pesick, RLUIPA: What's the Use?, 17 MICH. J. RACE & L. 359 (2012); Noelle
V. Crisalli, Note, Civil Libertiesfor Urban Believers v. City of Chicago: A Defining Case for the SubstantialBurden Test Under the Religious Land Use and InstitutionalizedPersons Act, 23 PACE ENVTL.

L. REv. 263 (2006).
74 United States v. Vill. of Airmont, No. 05-5520, slip opinion at 16 n. 11 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2008) (on
file with authors) (finding it unnecessary to resolve the issue "because the Government had pled sufficient facts for this Court to allow its substantial burden claim to go forward").
75 Cf Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 165 (3d Cir. 2002) ("[I]f the law is
not neutral (i.e., if it discriminates against religiously motivated conduct) . . . strict scrutiny applies and
the burden on religious conduct violates the Free Exercise Clause unless it is narrowly tailored to ad-
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permit application but Jewish synagogues $150 would clearly violate Section 2000cc(b)(2) by discriminating on the basis of religion even though
Section 2000cc(a) may not be violated because the payment of an additional
fifty dollars could be said not to substantially burden religious exercise.
Similarly, a zoning law that prohibited any place of worship from exceeding 10,000 square feet in floor space could substantially burden religious
exercise, even if it applied neutrally to all religions and thus it would not
violate the Nondiscrimination provision.
Therefore, although the principles underpinning both sections are intertwined,76 they are distinct concepts requiring separate analyses. However,
some courts have required plaintiffs to show that their worship has been
substantially burdened in order to reach Subsection (b) claims. In Lighthouse Institute for Evangelism v. City of Long Branch, the district court's

erroneously narrow reading of RLUIPA led it to require that RLUIPA
plaintiffs show a substantial burden in order to reach the merits of a claim
brought under Subsection (b)." The Third Circuit explicitly reversed the
lower court on this point, noting that "[s]ince Congress evidently knew how
to require a showing of a substantial burden, it must have intended not to do
so in the Equal Terms provision.""
Other courts have applied the strict scrutiny analysis to a Subsection (b)
claim.7 The Ninth Circuit recently rejected this approach:
Both because the language of the Equal Terms provision does not allow for it,
and because it would violate the "broad construction" provision, we cannot accept the notion that a "compelling governmental interest" is an exception to the

vance a compelling government interest.").
76 See Sts. Constantine & Helen Greek Orthodox Church, Inc. v. City of New Berlin, 396 F.3d 895, 900
(7th Cir. 2005) ("On this construal, the 'substantial burden' provision backstops the explicit prohibition
of religious discrimination in the later section of the Act, much as the disparate-impact theory of employment discrimination backstops the prohibition of intentional discrimination.").
Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 406 F. Supp. 2d 507, 519 (D.N.J. 2005)
("As such, plaintiffs' failure to demonstrate a substantial burden under Section (a) is fatal to his claims
under Section (b)."), rev 'd, Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 213,
262-64 (3d Cir. 2007); see also Vineyard Christian Fellowship of Evanston, Inc. v. City of Evanston,
250 F. Supp. 2d 961, 992-93 (N.D. ill. 2003) (explaining that Section 2000cc(b) should be read as a
subset of Section 2000cc(a).).
78 See Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 262-63 (3d Cir.
2007), cert denied, 553 U.S. 1065 (2008); cf Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d
144, 165 (3d Cir. 2002) ("[I]f the law is not neutral (i.e., if it discriminates against religiously motivated
conduct) . . .strict scrutiny applies and the burden on religious conduct violates the Free Exercise Clause
unless it is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling government interest.").
79 See Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1232 (11th Cir. 2004)
(holding that a § 2000cc(b) violation "must undergo strict scrutiny"); see also Rocky Mountain Christian
Church v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 613 F.3d 1229, 1237 (10th Cir. 2010) ("Other circuits disagree whether RLUIPA implicitly includes an affirmative defense.").
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Equal Terms provision, or that the church has the burden of proving a "substantial burden" under the Equal Terms provision.o

Similarly, in Adhi Parasakthi Charitable, Medical, Educational, and
Cultural Society of North America v. Township of West Pikeland,the plain-

tiff asserted claims under each of RLUIPA's five land use provisions."'
The Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that, "[i]mportantly, there is no
'substantial burden' requirement under the discrimination path; any government discrimination against religion will implicate the Free Exercise
clause's protection."82 As the Nondiscrimination provision is located directly after the Equal Terms provision in the same section of the statute, it
should likewise not be subject to the substantial burden or strict scrutiny
analyses. It "is operatively independent of the jurisdictional prerequisites of
[2000cc(a)] . . . Plaintiffs need not allege a substantial burden to state

claims under RLUIPA §§ (b)(1) and (b)(2).""'
Conversely, a Substantial Burdens claim should not be dismissed for
failure to demonstrate that a zoning law, or the application of such a law,
discriminates against a religious entity. Courts often improperly read a
"discrimination" or "neutrality" requirement in a Subsection (a) claim. For
example, the Maryland federal district court granted summary judgment
against a church that brought suit against a county for changing its zoning
laws to prohibit places of worship after the church had already applied to do
so; the court held that there was no substantial burden on its religious exercise because "[t]here's no way in which the court can find that they have
been targeted, . . . ."" As the United States argued in its brief amicus curiae

in the appeal of that decision,
Bethel need not show that it was a "target" of a land use regulation to establish
that the regulation substantially burdens its religious exercise in violation of 42
U.S.C. 2000cc(a)(1). . . . Congress enacted RLUIPA in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Smith held that laws of general applicability that incidentally burden religious conduct do not violate the

80 Centro Familiar Cristiano Buenas Nuevas v. City of Yuma, 651 F.3d 1163, 1171-72
(9th Cir. 2011)

("The Constitutional phrases, 'substantial burden,' 'compelling governmental interest,' and 'least restrictive means,' are all included in the 'substantial burden' provision, not the 'Equal Terms' provision."
(footnote omitted)).
81 Adhi Parasakthi Charitable, Med., Educ., & Cultural Soc'y of N. Am. v. Twp. of W. Pikeland, 721 F.
Supp. 2d 361, 371-72 (E.D. Pa. 2010).
82 Id. at 377.
83 Hollywood Cmty. Synagogue, Inc. v. City of Hollywood, 430 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1320 (S.D. Fla.

2006).
84 Transcript of Record at 146, Bethel World Outreach Ministries v. Montgomery Cnty. Council, No.
18-1195 (D. Md. Sept. 26, 2011), appealfiled,No. 11-2176 (4th Cir. Oct. 24, 2011).
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Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and are not subject to strict scrutiny. Id. at 878-882. The effect of Smith, then, is that plaintiffs who raise
claims under the Free Exercise Clause must now show some form of government action that is aimed at. or targets, religion. Congress enacted RLUIPA
specifically for the purpose of changing that rule - and restoring the substantial
burden test that had existed prior to Smith. under which a plaintiff did not have
to show that the government's action is aimed at religion . .. Thus, the fact that
the Council did not "target" Bethel when passing ZTA 07-07 is irrelevant;
whether Bethel was a "target" of ZTA 07-07 has absolutely no bearing on
whether ZTA 07-07 constituted a substantial burden on Bethel's religious exer85
cise under 42 U.S.C. 2000cc(a)(1).

Sections (a) and (b) of RLUIPA's land-use provisions are conceptually
distinct, are separated within the statute itself, and principles of statutory
construction require that they not be conflated in their application.
3. Dismissing Nondiscrimination Claims for Failure to Provide Direct
Evidence of Discriminatory Animus
Local governments often argue that their conduct should not be considered discriminatory in the absence of a facially discriminatory law8 6 or a
showing by the plaintiff of some animus or hostility on the part of all governmental actors that motivated the challenged action. In Roman Catholic
Bishop of Springfield, the District of Massachusetts noted that "the Nondiscrimination provision sets a higher bar for plaintiffs by requiring evidence
that the government action was motivated by ('on the basis of') religion."
That court required the plaintiff to show some "discriminatory animus" in
order to make its prima facie case of discrimination.88 Similarly, a Michigan trial court dismissed a Nondiscrimination claim merely because the
administrative zoning record did not demonstrate "religious animus,"89 regardless of the large amount of evidence that the church had been treated
85 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant at 19-20, Bethel World
Outreach Ministries v. Montgomery Cnty. Council, (4th Cir. 2012) (No. 11-2716) (footnote omitted) (on
file with authors).
86 United States v. Vill. of Airmont, No. 05-5520, slip op. at 16 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2008) ("The Defendants argue that only laws that facially discriminate against religion or against a particular religious
group will violate section 2000cc(b)(2). Thus, the Defendants assert, the Code does not violate the Nondiscrimination provision because the Code is facially neutral towards religion generally and towards
particular religious groups.") (on file with authors).
7 Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield v. City of Springfield, 760 F. Supp. 2d 172, 191 (D. Mass.
2011).
88 Id.
89 Great Lakes Soc'y v. Georgetown Twp., No. 03-45966, slip
op. at 9 (Ottawa Cnty. Cir. Ct. July 20,

2007) (on file with authors); Great Lakes Soc'y v. Georgetown Twp., No. 03-45966, slip op. at 10 n.4
(Ottawa Cnty. Cir. Ct. Apr. 12, 2006) (on file with authors).
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differently and worse than every other religious institution within the jurisdiction. 90
There is no language, however, in RLUIPA that requires a showing of direct evidence of "animus."91 Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit acknowledged in Saints Constantine and Helen Greek Orthodox Church, the "vul-

nerability" of religious groups that are not of the mainstream "to subtle
forms of discrimination when, as in the case of the grant or denial of zoning
variances, a state delegates essentially standardless discretion to nonprofessionals operating without procedural safeguards."92 Thus, "[o]n this construal, the 'substantial burden' provision backstops the explicit prohibition
of religious discrimination in the later section of [RLUIPA], much as the
disparate-impact theory of employment discrimination backstops the prohibition of intentional discrimination."93
Courts should not confuse the equal protection requirement that a plaintiff must establish discriminatory intent94With an obligation to present specific anti-religious statements demonstrating personal animus on the part of
the government decision-makers in a RLUIPA claim. The latter requirement leads to a more stringent application than is required by equal protection jurisprudence or warranted by the express language of the statute. The
ferreting out of invidious discrimination as a purpose behind the application
of facially neutral laws is well within the established judicial framework for
equal protection cases and other federal civil rights statutes protecting
against disparate treatment. 95
The recent case of Church of Scientology of Georgia, Inc. v. City of

Sandy Springs is the first to confront these discriminatory intent issues
head-on, describing the various methods of demonstrating discriminatory
intent or disparate impact without limiting its analysis to direct statements
of personal animus.96 The court held that "to make out a prima facie case of
discrimination under Section (b) of RLUIPA, Plaintiff must present evidence of intentional or purposeful discrimination by the City because of
Plaintiffs religious denomination."97 The court then explained that such
90 Great Lakes Soc'y v. Georgetown Twp, 761 N.W.2d. 371 (Mich. App. 2008).
91 Vill. ofAirmont, slip op. at 16 ("A party may bring a facial or as-applied challenge under
the Nondiscrimination provision.").
92 Sts. Constantine & Helen Greek Orthodox Church, Inc. v. City of New Berlin, 396 F.3d 895, 900 (7th
Cir. 2005).
93 Id.
94 Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266-67 (1977).
95 Id.
96 Church of Scientology of Ga. v. City of Sandy Springs, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1370 (N.D. Ga. 2012).
9 Id.
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evidence can include:
(1) historical background of the decision, particularly if it reveals a series of official actions taken for invidious purposes, (2) the specific sequence of events
leading up to the challenged decision. (3) departures from the normal procedural sequence, as well as substantive departures, (4) legislative or administrative
history. especially where there are contemporary statements by members of the
decision-making body. minutes of its meetings, or reports, (5) foreseeability of
discriminatory impact. (6) knowledge of discriminatory impact. and (7) the
availability of less discriminatory alternatives. 98

These factors provide a basis for ascertaining the existence of a discrimi-

natory purpose behind an otherwise "facially neutral" application of zoning
laws that is not limited to direct evidence of invidious intent. Furthermore
claims for disparate impact do not require the showing of a discriminatory
intent.99 The analysis provided below in Section IV suggests an approach
for prosecuting and reviewing Nondiscrimination claims in line with established jurisprudence regarding the Equal Protection Clause and other federal civil rights statutes.
4. Requirement to Show Similarly Situated Comparators
Other courts have dismissed Section (b) claims-either under the Equal
Terms 00 or Nondiscrimination provisions-because plaintiffs failed to allege that they were treated differently and worse than a similarly situated
entity.101 Again, such a position is not faithful to the text or history of
RLUIPA. If an application for a land use permit is denied because the ap-

plicant belongs to a minority faith disfavored in the community, the government has "implement[ed] a land use regulation that discriminates against
any assembly or institution on the basis of religion," regardless of whether
98

Id. at 1371.
v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 2191, 2199 (2010).
100 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1) (2006); see 146 CONG. REC. S7774 (daily ed. Jul. 27, 2000)
(joint statement of Senator Hatch and Senator Kennedy on the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act of 2000).
101 See, e.g., Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield v. City of Springfield, 760 F. Supp. 2d
172, 189 (D.
Mass. 2011) ("Plaintiff presents no evidence of unequal treatment as compared to any secular comparator, whether similarly situated or not."); First Korean Church of New York, Inc. v. Cheltenham Twp.
Zoning Hearing Bd., No. 05-6389, 2012 WL 645986, slip op at *15 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 29, 2012) ("Because
[Plaintiff] has failed to identify a similarly situated better-treated nonreligious comparator, its as-applied
attack under RLUIPA's equal-terms provision fails."); Chabad Lubavitch of Litchfield Cnty., Inc. v.
Borough ofLitchfield, No. 09- 1419, 2012 WL 527851, slip op at *7-11 (D. Conn. Feb. 17, 2012) (dismissing the Equal Terms claim because Plaintiff did not demonstrate similarly situated secular comparators and dismissing the Nondiscrimination claim because Plaintiff did not demonstrate similarly situated

99 Lewis

religious comparators).
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it has treated any comparable entity more favorably.102 While evidence of
such comparable land use applicants is relevant to a claim of discrimination, it is not necessary to establish a Nondiscrimination violation.
Where comparisons are relevant-for instance, in a "selective enforcement" case where a jurisdiction has approved the applications of all places
of worship and then denied one for a mosque or synagogue-the question
arises as to how similarly situated the comparators must be to the claimant.
While a church with 100 parishioners may be comparable to one of 200, a
"mega-church" with 10,000 members might not be comparable in the same
location. The courts have yet to provide guidance on this issue with respect
to a Nondiscrimination claim; however the issue has been ruled upon by a
number of federal circuits with respect to Equal Terms claims. The plain
language of Section (b)(1) provides that "[n]o government shall impose or
implement a land use regulation in a manner that treats a religious assembly
or institution on less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or institution."103 On its face, the statute appears to create a strict liability standard
permitting religious institutions or assembly uses wherever any nonreligious institution or assembly use is permitted. This was a tough pill to
swallow for the courts of appeals.104
In an early case to address the subject, the Eleventh Circuit observed,
"while § (b)(1) has the 'feel' of an equal protection law, it lacks the 'similarly situated' requirement usually found in equal protection analysis."105 In
that case, the court found that the challenged ordinance was targeted at the
synagogue, which caused an impermissible "religious gerrymander" in addition to being facially discriminatory.106 The Eleventh Circuit has since
recognized a third kind of Equal Terms violation-the discriminatory application of a facially neutral regulation.107 This final type of violation does
102 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(2).
103 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1).
104 See, e.g., River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 369 (7th Cir.
2010) (en banc) (discussing Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1230-31 (11th
Cir. 2004)) ("Pressed too hard, this approach would give religious land uses favored treatment-imagine a
zoning ordinance that permits private clubs but not meeting halls used by political advocacy groups.");
Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 268 (3d Cir. 2007) (discussing
Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d at 1214) ("[U]nder the Eleventh Circuits interpretation, if a town allows a
local, ten-member book club to meet in the senior center, it must also permit a large church with a thousand members. . .").
105 Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d at 1229.
106 Id. at 1232-33. This factual pattern--where a new ordinance is passed (especially soon after a religious organization purchased property or applied for a land use permit) to preclude the development of
land for religious purposes by a disfavored faith group--is common and should be viewed as giving rise
to a potential Nondiscrimination claim. See infra Section IV(B).
107 A "selective enforcement" claim. See Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton,
Inc. v.
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require a similarly situated comparator, one that has a "comparable community impact."108
The Third Circuit used a more specific test in Lighthouse Institute for
Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch,109 holding that the Equal Terms

provision "require[s] a secular comparator that is similarly situated as to the
regulatory purpose of the regulation."110

The Seventh Circuit considered

and rejected the Third Circuit's test before setting forth its own requirement
that a sufficient comparator must be similarly situated as to "accepted zoning criteria."111 The Second Circuit refused to adopt either of these tests,

holding that the religious and secular entities' "activities were similarly situated with regard to their legality under New York City law."112 The Fifth
Circuit held that "[t]he 'less than equal terms' must be measured by the ordinance itself and the criteria by which it treats institutions differently."113
Against this tableau, determining whether a Nondiscrimination plaintiff
must demonstrate that it has been treated differently than a similarly situated comparator, and which comparators might qualify, is a daunting task.
Unlike the Equal Terms provision, the plain language of the Nondiscrimination provision does not require a comparator, and thus such evidence is not
necessary to establish a Nondiscrimination claim. Yet, in discrimination
cases based on selective enforcement or disparate impact, a comparator may
be identified.114 The approach of the Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits
favors the religious institution by using objective criteria to judge whether
one entity is similarly situated enough to another rather than using the criteria selected by the local government itself as in the "regulatory purpose"
standard of the Third Circuit.

Broward Cnty., 450 F.3d 1295, 1310-11 (11th Cir. 2006) (discussing Konikov v. Orange Cnty., 410
F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2005)). See generally infra Section IV(C) (discussing selective enforcement).
108 Konikov, 410 F.3d at 1327.
109 Lighthouse, 510 F.3d 253.
110 Id. at 264.
111 See River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 371 (7th Cir. 2010) (en
banc) (emphasis added.)
112 See Third Church of Christ, Scientist v. City of New York, 626 F.3d 667, 670 (2nd Cir. 2010).
113 See Elijah Grp., Inc. v. City of Leon Valley, 643 F.3d 419, 424 (5th Cir. 2011). That court specifically noted that its "analysis should not be interpreted as necessarily adopting any of the tests heretofore
adopted by the other circuits." Id. at n.19.
114 In one of the few cases analyzing a Nondiscrimination claim, a federal court incorporated a "similarly situated" standard. Albanian Associated Fund v. Twp. of Wayne, No. 06-3217, 2007 WL 2904194, at
*10 (D.N.J. Oct. 1, 2007). There, a Muslim group alleged discriminatory treatment under the guise of a
municipality's purported concern for protecting open space. Id. at *11. The District of New Jersey
acknowledged that a Catholic hospital could be a valid comparator, even though the desired use of the
development was dissimilar. Id
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111. A BURDEN-SHIFTING PROPOSAL FOR THE APPLICATION OF RLUIPA's
NONDISCRIMINATION PROVISION

The legislative history behind RLUIPA makes clear that it was
meant to codify existing equal protection analysis, preserving it in light of
what many saw as an encroachment on fundamental rights. As one court
observed:
RLUIPA is designed to protect the non-discrimination principles of the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment, as well as the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In short, the scope of
the rights at issue is the rights protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment, made applicable to the states under the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, as those rights implicate land use decisions affecting religious assemblies or institutions. 115

The Nondiscrimination provision, which seeks to protect a fundamental
right and prohibit discrimination "on the basis of religion" is thus within the
purview of a diverse and well-developed body of federal civil rights law
that seeks to redress the harms of invidious discrimination based on certain
classifications that Congress deemed worthy of protection.116

The case law setting forth a burden-shifting framework and the elements
of a prima facie case for discrimination claims should be applied to
RLUIPA Nondiscrimination claims. In light of the confusion surrounding
how to plead and analyze such claims, and the analogues between discrimination based on religion and discrimination based on age, sex, race, or disability, precedents in these types of cases should serve as guideposts. Like
racial discrimination cases, there is not a single "silver bullet" answer.
Courts and practitioners will benefit from considering the various recognized contexts in which discrimination may occur, which are set forth below and explained in greater detail in Section IV.

A. The Extension of McDonnell Douglas Burden-Shifting
First, regarding the respective burdens of proof in RLUIPA Nondiscrimination cases, the authors propose the extension of the burden-shifting
framework first developed by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas

115 Rocky Mountain Christian Church v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 612 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1184 (D. Colo.
2009) (citing Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1238 (11th Cir. 2004)).
116

See Vision Church v. Vill. of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 1000 (7th Cir. 2006).
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Corporation v. Green. 117 McDonnell Douglas was an early case interpret-

ing provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964118 ("Title VII"),
in which the Supreme Court was called upon to illuminate "the order and
allocation of proof in a private, non-class action challenging employment
discrimination."119 The plaintiff was an African-American mechanic and
laboratory technician whose employment was terminated pursuant to a general layoff.120 He argued that African-American employees had been targeted during the layoff and that the defendant manufacturing company's
hiring policies were also discriminatory.121 After he was terminated, the
plaintiff participated in an illegal demonstration that resulted in employees
missing part of a morning shift at the company's plant.122 The company
thereafter began hiring new mechanics and the plaintiff applied for reemployment.123 The company refused to re-hire him based on his participation in the demonstration.124 The plaintiff challenged the company's decision under two provisions of Title VII that prohibit racial discrimination:
the first prohibiting discrimination in employment decisions generally, and
the second prohibiting retribution against an applicant or employee who
demonstrates against discriminatory conditions.125
The Court began with its interpretation of the congressional purpose behind Title VII: "to assure equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered racially stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens."126
It

then

quoted

itself

from

Griggs v.

Duke

Power Company:

"[d]iscriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority, is precisely and only what Congress has proscribed. What is required by Congress is
the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment
when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial
or other impermissible classification."127
Title VII places the initial burden on the plaintiff to make a prima facie

117 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
118 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (2012); McDonnell Douglas,411 U.S. at 792.
119 McDonnell Douglas,411 U.S. at 800.
120 Id. at 794.
121

Id.
122 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 796 (1973).
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 800.

127 Id. at 800-01 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971)).
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case of discrimination.128 In McDonnell Douglas, the prima facie case of
employment discrimination requires four elements:
(i) that [the plaintiff] belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was

qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of [the plaintiff s] qualifications. 129

In McDonnell Douglas, it was undisputed that the plaintiff made a prima
facie case. 130 The Court then noted that "[t]he burden then must shift to the
employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
employee's rejection."131 Finding that the company had articulated such a

reason, namely that the plaintiff had engaged in "deliberate, unlawful activity against it,"132 the Court held that "the inquiry must not end here."1 3 3 The
Court was concerned with an employer's use of a facially nondiscriminatory reason that was actually pretext for some underlying discrimination.134
The Court went on to find that a Title VII plaintiff must "be afforded a fair
opportunity to show that [the employer's] stated reason for [his] rejection
was in fact pretext."1 35 The Court then described evidence that a plaintiff
might use show pretext: (1) the use of Caucasian comparators who had engaged in similar acts but who had been rehired; (2) "facts as to the [company's] treatment of [the plaintiff] during his prior term of employment"; (3)
the company's past reaction, if any, to the plaintiff s involvement in the civil rights movement; and, (4) evidence, such as statistics, that show the company's practices with regard to minority employment.136 The plaintiff
"must be given a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate by competent evi-

dence that the presumptively valid reasons for his rejection were in fact a
cover-up for a racially discriminatory decision."137
The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework has been extended
to cases brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (the
"ADEA"),138 the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (the "Rehabilitation Act"),139
128 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b) (2006); MacKenzie v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 414 F.3d 1266, 1274 (10th
Cir. 2005); McDonnell Douglas,411 U.S. at 802.
129 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 803.
133 Id. at 804.
134 Id.
135 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973).
136
Id. at 804-05.
137 Id. at 805.
138 See, e.g., Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1010 (1st Cir. 1979).
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and certain cases brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act (the
"ADA")140 and the Family Medical Leave Act (the "FMLA").141 The
Fourth Circuit applied the burden-shifting test to the ADA in Kaylor v.
Fannin Regional Hospital because the Second Circuit had previously applied it to a case brought under the Rehabilitation Act in which an employer's actions were allegedly unrelated to the employee or applicant's disability.142
These decisions are indicative of prevailing trends related to the
application of such civil rights laws.143
At least one court has extended the framework to retaliation claims under
the FMLA:144
The language of the FMLA makes plain the purpose of Congress to assure
equality of employment opportunities for those individuals who assert their
rights under the FMLA. The burden shifting approach best effectuates the intent of the FMLA to prohibit discrimination against employees using FMLA
leave because it can most accurately balance providing employees a broader
basis for proving an employer violated the FMLA while also protecting the interests of employers. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 792, 93 S. Ct. at
1817 ("The broad, overriding interest, shared by employer, employee, and consumer, is efficient and trustworthy workmanship assured through fair and racially neutral employment and personnel decisions."). The burden shifting approach also places claims of FMLA discrimination under the well-settled rubric
of law governing discrimination claims under Title VII. the ADEA. etc.. and
145
thus ensures uniformity in analyzing discrimination in the workplace.

Although other courts have rejected this approach because "claims under
the FMLA do not depend on discrimination," the Kaylor court applied
McDonnell Douglas to a statute intended to ensure equality in the broadest
139 See Kevin W. Williams, Note, The Reasonable Accommodation Difference: The Effect of Applying
the Burden Shifting Frameworks Developed Under Title VII in Disparate Treatment Cases to Claims
Brought Under Title 1of the Americans iwith DisabilitiesAct, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 98, 113

(1997).
140 See, e.g., Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 50 n. 3 (2003) (noting with approval that "the
Court of Appeals proceeded under the familiar burden-shifting approach adopted by this Court in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green"); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12103 (2009). Specifically, courts
have applied the burden-shifting test to ADA cases in which the plaintiff cannot offer direct proof of
discrimination, resulting in disparate-treatment or disparate-impact claims. See Butler v. City of Prairie
Vill., Kan., 172 F.3d 736, 747-48 (10th Cir. 1999). The Fifth Circuit first applied the test based on its
belief that "[t]he Title VII jurisprudence is, we believe, for the most applicable to intentional to socialbias discrimination against handicapped persons." Prewift v. U.S. Postal Service, 662 F.2d 292, 305 n.
19 (5th Cir. 1981).
141 See, e.g., Kaylor v. Fannin Reg'1 Hosp. Inc., 946 F. Supp. 988, 1000 (N.D. Ga. 1996); see also 29

U.S.C. § 2601 (2006).
142 See Ennis v. Nat'l Ass'n of Bus & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 58 (4th Cir. 1995).
143 See, e.g., Williams v. Widnall, 79 F.3d 1003, 1005 n. 3 (10th Cir. 1996).
144 Id.

145 Kaylor, 946 F. Supp. at 1000.
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terms, as does RLUIPA.146

B. The Congressional Intent Behind RLUIPA's Nondiscrimination
Provision Supports Burden-Shifting
Religion, like race, is a suspect classification under Title V11147 as well as
a fundamental right guaranteed to equal protection.148 In the House of Representatives report on the Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999,
RLUIPA's predecessor bill, the Committee on the Judiciary noted that
"H.R. 1691's purpose is to protect religious liberty, one of the most fundamental of 'civil rights."'149 RLUIPA's final form does not contain a statement of congressional findings and purposes. When enacting RFRA, Congress specified that the purposes of the law were:
(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner. 374
U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee
its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened; and
(2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by government.1so

After an examination of the legislative record behind RFRA, the Supreme Court noted that, "Congress' concern was with the incidental burdens imposed, not the object or purpose of the legislation."151 RFRA contained only a substantial burden test, with no analogue to RLUIPA's
Nondiscrimination provision.152
In the "Summary and Purpose" section of the Joint Statement regarding
RLUIPA, Senators Hatch and Kennedy reference RFRA, providing that,
within the scope of Congress's power to enact RLUIPA,
[T]he bill applies the standard of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1994): if government substantially burdens the exercise of
religion, it must demonstrate that imposing that burden on the claimant serves a
compelling interest by the least restrictive means. In addition, with respect to
land use regulation, the bill specifically prohibits various forms of religious
146
147
148
149

Diaz v. Fort Wayne Foundry Corp., 131 F.3d 711, 712 (7th Cir. 1997).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(b) (2006).
See Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 273 (1951).
H. REP. No. 106-219, at 13 (1999).

150 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(B)(1 2) (2006).
151 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 531 (1997).
152 See id. at 515-16.
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15 3

The Joint Statement "Need for Legislation" section makes plain that
Congress was primarily interested in using its power to alleviate the widespread discriminationl54 in land use regulation:
The hearing record compiled massive evidence that this right is frequently violated. Churches in general, and new, small. or unfamiliar churches in particular, are frequently discriminated against on the face of zoning codes and also in
the highly individualized and discretionary processes of land use regulation.
Zoning codes frequently exclude churches in places where they permit theaters.
meeting halls, and other places where large groups of people assemble for secular purposes. Or the codes permit churches only with individualized permission
from the zoning board, and zoning boards use that authority in discriminatory
ways.
Sometimes, zoning board members or neighborhood residents explicitly offer
race or religion as the reason to exclude a proposed church, especially in cases
of black churches and Jewish shuls and synagogues. More often. discrimination lurks behind such vague and universally applicable reasons as traffic, aesthetics. or "not consistent with the city's land use plan." Churches have been
excluded from residential zones because they generate too much traffic, and
from commercial zones because they don't generate enough traffic. Churches
have been denied the right to meet in rented storefronts, in abandoned schools,
in converted funeral homes, theaters, and skating rinks-in all sorts of buildings
that were permitted when they generated traffic for secular purposes.'

The Senators noted that the Nondiscrimination section was meant to prohibit "various forms of discrimination against or among land uses."15 6 This
statement demonstrates that RLUIPA was intended to be remedial. The
plain language of the statute sets forth that RLUIPA "shall be construed in
favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent
permitted by the terms of [the Act] and the Constitution."157 Thus, although
Congress observed that discrimination may take many forms, the congressional intent behind RLUIPA is for courts to afford the broadest protection
possible to religious groups alleging discriminatory treatment from local
governing boards.158 Presumably, Congress had this "broad protection" in
153 146 CONG. RFEc. S7774-01 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sens. Hatch and
Kennedy)
(emphasis added).
154 See id. at S7774-S7775 ("The hearing record contains much evidence that these forms of discrimination are very widespread. Some of this evidence is statistical-from national surveys of cases, churches,
zoning codes, and public attitudes. Some of it is anecdotal, with examples from all over the country.
Some of it is testimony by witnesses with wide experience who say that the anecdotes are representative.").
155 Id.

156 Id. at S7775.
157 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g).
158 See ProtectingReligious Liberty: Hearings on H.R. 1691 Before the Subconn.
on the Constitution
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mind when it placed the burden of persuasion on the local government in
Nondiscrimination claims:
BURDEN OF PERSUASION- If a plaintiff produces prima facie evidence to
support a claim alleging a violation of the Free Exercise Clause or a violation
of section 2. the government shall bear the burden of persuasion on any element
of the claim, except that the plaintiff shall bear the burden of persuasion on
whether the law (including a regulation) or government practice that is challenged by the claim substantially burdens the plaintiffs exercise of religion. 159

Therefore, the text of RLUIPA itself supports the burden-shifting approach. A plaintiff s prima facie case will depend on the land use provision
pleaded and in which federal circuit the case is heard.160 A claimant under
Section (a) must demonstrate that the land use regulation substantially burdens its religious exercise;161 if so, the strict scrutiny standard must be met
and the regulation must "[employ] a narrowly tailored means of achieving a
compelling government interest."'162 Under the Equal Terms provision, the

plaintiff may be required to "present evidence that a similarly situated nonreligious comparator received differential treatment under the challenged
regulation."163 Once the plaintiff has met its burden, the statute calls for the
burden of persuasion to shift to the local government. 164
The extension of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to

Nondiscrimination claims would allow plaintiffs the opportunity to show
that the proffered justification of a facially neutral imposition or application
of a land use law is pretextual. This is an approach consistent with
RLUIPA's text and legislative history as well as a well-developed civil
rights jurisprudence. Such an opportunity would fit the analysis of these
types of claims within the general discrimination framework that is familiar
to courts and practitioners. Furthermore, without such a standard, ferreting
of the H. Commn.
on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 211 (1999) (testimony of Prof. Douglas Laycock, University of Texas Law School) ("Section 3(a) provides that if a claimant demonstrates a prima facie violation of the Free Exercise Clause, the burden of persuasion then shifts to the government on all issues
except burden on religious exercise. No element of the Court's definition of a free exercise violation is
changed, but in cases where a court is unsure of the facts, the risk of nonpersuasion is placed on government instead of on the claim of religious liberty. This provision facilitates enforcement of the constitutional right as the Supreme Court has defined it.").
159 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b) (2006); see also Church of Scientology of Georgia, Inc. v. City of
Sandy Springs, Ga., 843 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1360 (N.D. Ga. 2012) (citing Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. v. Broward Cnty., 450 F.3d 1295, 1308 (11th Cir. 2006)).
160 There is little guidance, and no consensus, on how to establish a prima facie case for a Nondiscrimination challenge; the authors' suggestion follows.
16142 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1) (2000).
162 PruneraIglesia Bautista,450 F.3d 1308.
163 See PruneraIglesia, 450 F.3d
at 1311.
164 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b).
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out discrimination in these types of cases amounts to little more than
guesswork and inconsistent application of the statute.
IV. APPLICATION

OF THE STANDARD

Courts confronting Nondiscrimination claims have noted the dearth
of reported cases concerning this provision.165 In Adhi Parasakthi Charitable, Medical, Educational,and Cultural Society of North America v. Township of West Pikeland,the plaintiff escaped summary judgment on its Non-

discrimination claim based on the court's analysis of its Free Exercise
claim.166 The court found that the law imposed was facially neutral, but
held that "[a] jury, therefore, must determine the factual issue of discriminatory application."167 What standards might guide that jury were not defined.
In perhaps the most detailed analysis of the Nondiscrimination provision, Church of Scientology of Georgia, Inc. v. City of Sandy Springs in-

volved a motion to reconsider the court's earlier grant of summary judgment to the defendants.168
The court reviewed the three forms of
discrimination that are recognized in the Eleventh Circuit in claims brought
under the Equal Protection Clause: "(1) a statute that facially differentiates
between religious assemblies or institutions; (2) a facially neutral statute
that is nevertheless 'gerrymandered' to place a burden solely on a particular
religious assembly or institution; or (3) a truly neutral statute that is selectively enforced against one religious denomination as opposed to another."1 69 The court treated that case as a "selective enforcement" action, ultimately holding that there was sufficient evidence to create a jury question
on the Nondiscrimination claim, but insufficient evidence to determine
whether the plaintiff had met its burden of establishing a prima facie case
for discrimination.170

In Church of the Hills of the Township of Bedminster v. the Township of Bedminster,171 the court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss
165 Church of Scientology of Georgia, Inc. v. City of Sandy Springs, Ga., No. 10-0082, 2012 WL
500263, at *23 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 10, 2012); Covenant Christian Ministries, Inc. v. City of Marietta, Ga.,
No. 2008 WL 8866408, at *15 (N.D. Ga.).
166 Adhi Parasakthi Charitable Med., Educ., & Cultural Soc'y of N. Am. v. Twp of W. Pikeland, 721 F.
Supp. 2d 361, 379 (E.D. Pa. 2010).
167 Id.

168 Church of Scientology of Ga, Inc. v. City of Sandy Springs, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1349-50
(N.D.
Ga. 2012).
169 Id. at 1361 (citing Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. v. Broward Cnty.,
450 F.3d
1295, 1308 (11th Cir. 2006)).
170
Id. at 1361-62.
171 Church of the Hills of Bedminister v. Twp. Of Bedminster, No. 05-3332, 2006 WL 462674
at *12
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and examined the plaintiffs' equal protection claim under a "disparate
treatment"-type analysis. 172 The court held that, in order "[to establish an
equal protection claim, the Plaintiffs must establish that they were treated
differently from other similarly situated persons who were granted similar
variances in a similarly zoned parcel of land."173 The equal protection claim
survived because "[t]he Plaintiffs' Complaint allege[d] that the Township
has granted zoning variances to other churches located in R-10 zones within
the town. . . . Accordingly, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs have suffi-

ciently alleged that other similarly situated uses within the Township's R-10
zones were granted variances similar to the ones sought by the Church in
the present case."174 Importantly, the court then shifted the burden to the
Township to demonstrate that the differential treatment was not based on
discriminatory motivations, albeit under a less rigorous rational basis standard: "This places the burden on the Township to either refute the allegation
or to demonstrate why the denial of the Church's variances, as opposed to
any given to similarly situated churches, were rationally related to a legitimate state interest."175
Invidious discrimination may take many forms. In order to fully effectuate the purposes of the Nondiscrimination provision, practitioners should be
able to identify the various fact patterns demonstrating discrimination
against a religious entity. These include, but are not limited to: (1) direct
evidence of discrimination; (2) "gerrymandering" laws that may be facially
neutral but were designed to prevent a particular applicant from building a
religious facility; (3) disparate treatment, whereby one religious organization is disfavored in the discretionary application of zoning laws; and (4)
laws that may be facially neutral but have a disparate impact on certain religious groups.
Direct evidence of discriminatory intent-what the authors describe as
"Torches and Pitchforks" discrimination176-Will be the easiest of these to
(D.N.J. Feb. 24, 2006).
172 Id. at * 12. Although the plaintiff had advanced a RLUIPA Nondiscrimination claim, the court did
not include any mention of it in the opinion. Complaint at 157-58, Church of the Hills of Bedminister v.
Twp. Of Bedminster, No. 05-3332, 2006 WL 462674 (D.N.J. July 7, 2005) (on file with authors).
173 Church ofthe Hills ofBedininister,2006 WL 462674,
at *8.
174
1d. at *10.
175 Id.
176

See

YOUNG

FRANKENSTEIN

(Gruskoff/Venture

Films

1974),

available

at

http://www.moviescriptsource.com/movie-script.php?id=286 ("VILLAGERS, with torches and DOGS,
stand on the street, in front of the Burgomeister's steps. FIRST VILLAGER: The monster, sir. The Monster is loose. BURGOMEISTER: Do you realize it's after eight o'clock??? SECOND VILLAGER: Yes,
sir, but the monster. He's escaped! THIRD VILLAGER: He's running through the countryside, terrorizing the villagers. No one is safe. . . . ASSORTEDVILLAGERS: Yes! The monster! Kill the monster!
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recognize, and calls to mind the integration of Alabama high schools.177
Yet, such religious discrimination is not an anachronism. 178 One example
of such a fact pattern is described in a 2009 federal decision that recounted
the trials faced by the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community in attempting to locate in a small Maryland town, where the Town's Burgess was alleged to
have made statements such as:
Muslims are a whole different culture from us. . . The situation with the Muslims is a touchy worldwide situation, so people are antsy over that. . . But for
the most part people. I don't know if they're dramatically upset, but they are
definitely concerned, I-like me, I am concerned myself . . . I understand the
world climate. I understand what's going on. I do remember . . . 9/11 very vividly so it's only that thing sticks in your mind . . . There's a lot of animosity.
Not, that's not a good word. There's a lot of, shall we say, "apprehension"
about the AMC's application . .. It's a different culture moving into town, a culture we're not used to . . . This town is not very diversified. You know what I
mean? We're sitting back here off the radar scope and living in our little piece
of heaven ... Let me be sure I understand, f his is done [i.e. denying the special exception] the Muslims are gone. right?

Such attitudes are not uncommon: "An Airmont, [New York,] mayor described Orthodox Jews as 'foreigners and interlopers,' who were 'ignorant
and uneducated' and 'an insult to' the community."180 A trustee of that vil-

lage "stated that 'the only reason we formed this village is to keep those
Jews from Williamsburg out of here."'181

The FBI is offering a $20,000

reward for information leading to the arrest in the arson of construction
equipment in Murfreesboro, Tennessee, where a religious community has
faced astonishing opposition to its new mosque and community center before it ultimately prevailed in court. 182 Asian Americans recently faced
The monster must be destroyed!").
177 See generally Note, IntegrationofHigherEducation in the South, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 112 (1969).

178 H. Rep. No. 106-219, at 23 (1999) (recounting testimony before the House Judiciary Committee
including anecdotes that neighbors to proposed worship facilities have made such facially discriminatory
statements as "Hitler should have killed more of you" and "Let's keep these God damned Pentecostals
out of here.").
179 Moxley v. Town of Walkersville, 601 F. Supp. 2d 648, 655 (D. Md. 2009); see also Phillip Rucker,
Uneasy Feelings Moving In, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 2007, at BO1 ('"I'm not in favor of that group being
this close,' said David 'Reds' Main, standing behind the counter at the duckpin bowling alley he has run
since the 1970s. 'They have a right to their religion like anybody else,' he said. 'But it goes back to 9/11
to get the trust back and convince yourself that not all Muslims are terrorists."').
180 United States v. Vill. of Airmont, No. 05-5520, slip op. at 5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2008) (quoting Leblanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, No. 96-6149, 1996 WL 699648, at *1 (2d Cir. Dec. 6, 1996)) (on file with
authors).
181 Id.

182 See ATF Lab Confirms Accelerants Used at Future Site of the Islamic Center of Muifreesboro,

FBI.GOv (Sep. 3, 2010), http://www.fbi.gov/memphis/press-releases/2010/me090310.htm; see also Texas Man Indicted for Threatening to Bomb Islamic Center in Murfreesboro, FBI.Gov (June 21, 2012),
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community opposition, such as:
In New Jersey right now there's 240,000 Asian Americans in New Jersey. In
Middlesex County, there's more than any other county right in Middlesex
County. That's just 2000, the census from 2000. From 1990 to - there was
114,000. 2000. which is 10 years later, it's doubled to 224.000. Now they're
going to do another census in 2010. What's it going to be then? If there's only
a limited amount of churches, where do these people park when they come to
this church? There's a lot of Asian Americans, where do they park? 183

Neither are lesser-known Christian groups immune from such targeting.
The Michigan-based Great Lakes Society was denied a special use permit to
build a place of worship in a jurisdiction where a township official was
quoted as stating: "It's not a church. The issue is that they're just not a
church."184

Not all evidence of discrimination is as blatant, however. Indirect evidence of discrimination is often necessary to demonstrate what the Supreme
Court has described as "practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in
practice."185 This includes, for instance, the preferential treatment of some

religious groups over others through the selective enforcement of certain
laws that vest great discretion among nonprofessional land-use officials. A
local government may enact a law specifically designed to prevent a certain
religious group from locating within its jurisdiction and later claim that it
was merely tidying up its zoning code.186 Similarly, zoning regulations that
have a disparate impact will also require courts and practitioners to carefully examine all of the facts surrounding not only the immediate application,
but years of past applications.187
The small number of successful Nondiscrimination claims is indicative
of the difficulty inherent in pleading and proving them. Certainly the lack
of positive case law begets disuse, as practitioners may not wish to plead a
cause of action for which are there are almost no discernible standards. The
http://www.fbi.gov/memphis/press-releases/2012/texas-man-indicted-for-threatening-to-bomb-islamiccenter-in-murfreesboro); United States v. Rutherford Cnty., No. 3:12-0737, 2012 WL 2930076 at *2
(M.D. Tenn. July 18, 2012) (ordering the county to process and issue certificate of occupancy for
mosque) (on file with authors).
183 Dayalbagh Radhasoami Satsang Ass n, Hearing on Application No. 18-07Z Before the Board of
Adjustment for the Township of Old Bridge, New Jersey 69 (2008) (transcript on file with authors).
184 Barton Deiters, Church Sues, Claims Bias in Building Ban, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Apr. 2, 2003, at
C4.
185 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
186 See, e.g., Reaching Hearts Int'l v. Prince George's Cnty., 584 F. Supp. 2d 766, 783 (D. Md.
2008),

aff'd, 368 Fed. App'x 370 (4th Cir. 2010) (explaining the stated purposed of achieving consistency was
merely superficial).
187 See, e.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267 (1977).
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current landscape, in which litigants often simply appeal to a judge's intuition without overriding standards, cannot be maintained. However, there is
extensive case law examining how each of these types of cases might be
proven in the employment discrimination context. This body of law, employing the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting set forth above, should be
adapted to serve as the basis for RLUIPA Nondiscrimination claims. Applying this framework to each of the four fact patterns demonstrating discrimination set forth above provides plaintiffs with an opportunity to
demonstrate that they are being discriminated against on the basis of religion or religious denomination, whether by evidence of direct or indirect
discriminatory motivation.
The McDonnell Douglas test merely acts "to help the plaintiff overcome the formidable evidentiary difficulties of proving discrimination":188
Even an employer who knowingly discriminates on the basis of age may leave
no written records revealing the forbidden motive and may communicate it
orally to no one. When evidence is in existence, it is likely to be under the control of the employer, and the plaintiff may not succeed in turning it up. The indirect method compensates for these evidentiary difficulties by permitting the
plaintiff to prove his case by eliminating all lawful motivations, instead of
proving directly an unlawful motivation.189

Similarly, "Title VII law recognizes that discrimination is widespread in
our society and very difficult to prove."190 Often, however, the same claims
that would not survive under one Title VII theory will remain colorable under others.19 1

A. "Torches and Pitchforks" Discrimination
Any adequate application of the Nondiscrimination provision must include a review of the decisions of zoning boards in the context of the community's response to the zoning treatments sought. "To allow expression of
religious views by some and deny the same privilege to others merely because they or their views are unpopular, even deeply so, is a denial of equal
protection of the law forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment."192 Permitting the sentiment of the community to influence zoning decisions amounts
188 Oxman v. WLS-TV, 609 F. Supp. 1384, 1391 n.6 (N.D. 111.1985) (citing La Montagne v. Am. Convenience Products, Inc., 750 F.2d 1405, 1410 (7th Cir. 1984)).
189 Id.

190 Valdez v. Church's Fried Chicken, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 596, 624 (W.D. Tex. 1988).

191 See Lewis v. City of Chi., Ill., 130 S. Ct. 2191, 2199 (2010).
192 Niemotko v. State of Md., 340 U.S. 268, 284 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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to a "modified heckler's veto" abridging the exercise of a fundamental
right. 193 Zoning boards are made up of elected or appointed political actors.
Where these governmental actors make their decision within the context of
significant, discriminatory community opposition, or where zoning board
members themselves improperly attack or question the applicants' religious
beliefs, 194 discriminatory intent may be demonstrated.
It is well established that an application's denial, reached contrary to evidence or other factors that suggest approval, may give rise to an inference
of intentional discrimination.195 Similarly, "[r]arely can it be said that a legislature or administrative body operating under a broad mandate made a decision motivated solely by a single concern, or even that a particular purpose was the 'dominant' or 'primary' one."1 96 Still, some courts construing
RLUIPA have taken an improperly narrow view. For example, one Michigan court summarily concluded that "if there was a valid basis for the township's action the fact that there may also have been invalid reasons does not
give rise to a cause of action for any additionally stated invalid reasoning."197 While the evidence of some "invalid reason" should not automatically invalidate a zoning board's reasoning, neither should it be permitted to
automatically save a discriminatory decision by reference to some valid reason for denial. RLUIPA Nondiscrimination claimants should enjoy the
same opportunity to show that the valid reasons stated were actually pretextual (and that the discriminatory reason was a significant or dominant
concern) as for other types of discrimination claims.
The McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable where a plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination, such as discriminatory statements made by
government officials themselves.198 However, statements by members of
the public should also be available as indirect evidence of the motives of a
municipality. In United States v. Yonkers Board of Education,199 for example, the Second Circuit affirmed a district court finding that the City of
193 See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 119 (2001).
194 See Bass v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs., 256 F.3d 1095, 1105 (11th Cir. 2001) ("Direct evidence of discrimination is evidence which, if believed, would prove the existence of a fact in issue without inference
or presumption. Only the most blatant remarks, whose intent could be nothing other than to discriminate
on the basis of [the protected characteristic] . . . constitute direct evidence of discrimination." (quotations and citations omitted)), abrogationon other grounds,recognized by Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d
961, 971 (11th Cir. 2008).
195 See City of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267 (1977).
196 See id. at 265.
197 Great Lakes Soc'y v. Georgetown Charter Twp., No. 03-45966, slip op. at 3 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Jan. 15,
2010) (on file with authors).
198
See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985).
199 United States. v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1997).
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Yonkers and two of its agencies had "intentionally enhanced racial segregation" 200 in the city in violation of the Fair Housing Act (the "FHA") and of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment where the record
reflected a tremendous amount of racial animus present in the city. For example, attendees at the public meetings surrounding public housing proposals "made specific racial slurs inside and outside the hearing room," including, "we don't want those children" and worse. 201 Further, "[o]fficials
describing public meetings said racial motivations were 'definitely a consideration' and were 'thick in the air.'"202
In a manner familiar to RLUIPA practitioners, the city's defense to the
FHA claim was that "its housing decisions only responded to the concerns
of its citizens, and race was not found to be the citizens' 'dominant' concern." 203 These officials, it argued, "were entirely well-meaning public
servants acting in accordance with their perception of what was feasible in
the political and socio-economic circumstances of Yonkers and in the best
interests of that community."204 The court rejected the city's contention for
several reasons, including: (1) the active involvement of officials in the
promulgating of the negative community sentiment; (2) that racial animus
need only constitute a significant, not a dominant, factor in the community's motivation; and (3) that official action responsive to community opposition where race is a "significant" factor still violates the Equal Protection
Clause. 205 Thus,
Given the district court's finding, which is unimpeachable on the basis of the
present record, that racial animus was a significant factor motivating those
white residents who opposed the location of low-income housing in their predominantly white neighborhoods, the City may properly be held liable for the
206
segregative effects of a decision to cater to this "will of the people."

The Tenth Circuit has extended this reasoning to an FHA and Equal Protection case, in which "the race issue was not discussed at any of the public
meetings and . . . there was no evidence of racial prejudice on the part of
any city official."207 In Dailey v. City of Lawton, a Catholic church sought

to convert an unused school into an integrated low-income housing project,

200

Id. at 1184.

201

Id. at 1207.

202

204

Id. at 1221.
Id at 1222.
Id. at 1223 (emphasis in original).

205

United States. v. Yonkers Bd.of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181, 1223 24 (2d Cir. 1997).

206

Id. at 1226.

207

Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037, 1039 (10th Cir. 1970).

203
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where it would have brought diversity to an otherwise segregated area. 208
Citing Shelley v. Kraemer, the court held "[in our opinion it is enough for
the complaining parties to show that the local officials are effectuating the
discriminatory designs of private individuals. "209
Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly included hostile statements of members of the community in its list of nonexclusive factors for
inferring discriminatory intent (which will be discussed in greater detail), it
has signaled a willingness to consider such statements. 210 In reviewing the
context of the ordinances at issue in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, the

Supreme Court noted that "relevant evidence" of an unconstitutionally gerrymandered law included statements by members of the decision-making
body.211 Yet, the Court also noted the actions of members of the public at
hearings, including "significant hostility exhibited by residents" and that
"[t]he public crowd that attended the June 9 meetings interrupted statements
by council members critical of Santeria with cheers and the brief comments
of [the church's priest] with taunts." 2 12

Such evidence of community hostility to minority and unfamiliar faiths
were of central importance to RLUIPA's drafters.213 The Congressional
Report includes specific instances of vicious bigotry in community meetings, including one in which "an objector turned to the people in the audience wearing skull caps and said 'Hitler should have killed more of
2
The Congressional Report also notes that when dealing with
you."' 14
community opposition, "[r]acial or ethnic discrimination may also play a
part" since differential treatment between denominations is also differential
treatment between black churches and white churches.215
In Moxley v. Town of Walkersville, the plaintiffs brought claims against a
community group that was allegedly formed for the sole purpose of pre-

venting a Muslim group from using farmland for the construction of a
mosque. 216 The complaint alleged that the group secretly met with town
2 08

Id. at 1038.
209 Id. at 1030 (citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)).
210 Compare City of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267 68
(1977) (providing factors for inferring discriminatory intent), iith Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,
Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 540-41 (1993) (noting hostile statements of members of community).
211 Church of the Lukumi BabaluAye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 540.
212 Id. at 541.
213 See H.R. REP. NO. 106-219, at 23 (1999).
214 H. REP. No. 106-219, at 23.
215 H. REP. No. 106-219, at n. 111.
216 Moxley v. Town of Walkersville, 601 F. Supp. 2d 648, 653 (D. Md. 2009).
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commissioners to formulate strategies for preventing the mosque's construction. 217 One commissioner was alleged to have provided "'talking
points' to use against the [mosque] and told the Private Defendants that following the points would avoid violations of [RLUIPA]" and advised "the
Private Defendants about how to approach the public hearings on the
[mosque's] petition, including refraining from using 'terms like Muslim,
those individuals, religion etc.,' and how many people should testify."218
Between that meeting and the vote on the mosque's request for a special
exception, the community group actively spoke out against the mosque,
with members allegedly making statements such as, "I'm trying to keep
Frederick free of people who don't belong" and spreading rumors that the
mosque would "be used to spread radical Islamic ideology."219 The District
Court held that the plaintiff could maintain counts for civil conspiracy
against certain members of the community who acted in concert with government officials.220 Although the fact pattern in Moxley provides an extreme example of collusion with government officials, it is not the only case
containing examples of community opposition to the "new or unfamiliar"
churches that RLUIPA was intended to protect. 221
To deny plaintiffs the opportunity to infer intentional discrimination
through the context in which decisions are made denies the realities of local
government. For example, in Westchester Day School v. Village of Mama-

roneck, the court reviewed the relationships between members of one zoning board, noting that many were members of a local social club, were longtime friends, socialized on a regular basis, or were business partners. 222
Zoning boards do not spring fully formed from county or village codes;
they are elected or appointed, and often politically answerable.223 They may
also be savvy enough to appeal to members of the community to further a
discriminatory agenda. Evidence of community opposition alone may not
be enough to constitute a prima facie case for a Nondiscrimination claim,
but it should, however, be recognized by the courts as a factor to be used in
conjunction with the other nonexclusive factors used to evaluate equal protection claims, such as deviations from the normal legislative patterns or
statements by lawmakers on the record.
217 Id. at 654.
218 Id
2191d at 654-655.
220 Id at 668.
221 See, e.g., Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 417 F. Supp. 2d 477, 507-08 (S.D.N.Y.
2006).
222 Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 417 F. Supp. 2d 477, 507-08 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
223 Id. at 507.
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B. "Gerrymandered" or Targeted Laws
Where a zoning code permits religious land use by right, or where there
is not even a fig leaf justification to deny a use completely, another common tactic is to enact a new ordinance that prohibits such use. Often, such
code amendments do not prohibit the use entirely, but are crafted in such a
manner as to limit only a subset of locations or activity-a subset that the
religious applicant invariably finds itself included within.224 The specific
timing, language of the amendment, and particularized effects will be relevant evidence in determining whether discrimination exists. Furthermore,
while the existence of comparators may play a role, they should not be essential to a claim that a law was passed to target one specific entity.
Zoning code amendments that are adopted soon after a minority religious
group purchases property and files for an application, which would prohibit
the group's desired use are unfortunately common. A complaint was filed
against the Village of Pomona, New York, 225 for adopting various zoning
code provisions regulating "dormitory" uses in a manner that would prohibit a planned ultra-Orthodox Jewish rabbinical college from locating anywhere within its jurisdiction by forbidding "separate cooking, dining or
housekeeping facilities,"226 requiring any educational uses to be "accredited," and creating other limitations rendering it impracticable to build the
college. If the very specific regulation of a use that thus far had not existed
anywhere within the village227 was insufficient evidence of a targeted law,
comments by the village's mayor at a public meeting were equally damning:
224 "Religious gerrymanders" are also potentially viable claims under the Equal Terms provision. See
Elijah Grp., Inc. v. City of Leon Valley, 643 F.3d 419, 422 23 (5th Cir. 2011) ("When alleging 'religious gerrymander,' a religious plaintiff must show that 'the challenged zoning regulation separates
permissible from impermissible assemblies or institutions in a way that burdens almost only religious
uses."' (quoting Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. v. Broward Cnty., 450 F.3d 1295,
1309 (11th Cir. 2006))); Church of Scientology of Ga., Inc. v. City of Sandy Springs, 843 F. Supp. 2d
1328, 1361 (N.D. Ga. 2012).
225 Second Amended Complaint, Congregation Rabbinical Coll. of Tartikov, Inc. v. Vill. of Pomona,
No. 07-6304 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2007) (on file with authors). See CongregationRabbinical College of
Tartikov, Inc. v. Village ofPomona, No. 07-6304, 2013 WL 66473, at *30, *47 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2013)
(denying motion to dismiss facial Nondiscrimination challenge to newly enacted ordinances where
"Plaintiffs pled that the timing of the enactment of one of the challenged ordinances demonstrates Defendants' discriminatory animus [and] Plaintiffs' allegations of racially charged public comments preceding the enactment ... suggests the existence of discriminatory motivation.").
226 Most students at the rabbinical college would be married and many would have children, necessitating that the dorms have kitchens. Id. at 59.
227 Id. at 172.
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Ladies and gentlemen, let me say something. We sitting at this table have limitations that are placed on us as to what we can say. and what we can't say, because our attorney tells us what we can say and what we can't say. I can't say
what I feel - I can't - if I agree with you, I don't agree with you, I don't have
that luxury of being able to say that here. All that I can say is that every member of this board works very, very hard to do what is best for this community.
You have your issues. Don't assume because no one has gotten up and said,
wow. I agree with you. oh boy; don't assume that because we didn't do that
that we don't agree. 228

Similarly, when Bethel World Outreach Ministries, a church that served
mostly African immigrants in Montgomery County, Maryland, purchased
property in the county's "RDT" zoning district-property that permitted a
church use by right-the county adopted a series of new regulations that
limited and finally prohibited the church's proposed use completely. 229 Unsurprisingly, the final amendment limited the ban to properties encumbered
with a certain type of property easement (which, of course, existed on Bethel's property). 230 In Moxley v. Town of Walkersville, two days after a Muslim group publicly disclosed that it sought to purchase land located within
the agricultural zoning district for use as a mosque, a County Commissioner
introduced an amendment to the zoning ordinance to prohibit places of worship in the agricultural zone even by special exception.231 In another recent
example, the Township of Old Bridge, New Jersey adopted a new ordinance
defining what constitutes permissible accessory uses of a house of worship.232 The timing of the ordinance resulted in the denial of a pending application by the Dayalbagh Radhasoami Satsang Association of North
America.233 The circumstances and effect of such gerrymandered laws at
228 Transcript at 58-59, In re Public Hearings on Local Law Amendment: Dormitories (Continued),
Local Law Amendment: Wetlands Before Vill. of Pomona Bd. of Trs. (Jan. 22, 2007) (on file with authors).
229 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant at 5-6, Bethel
World Outreach Ministries v. Montgomery Cnty. Council, No. 11-2176 (4th Cir. Apr. 12, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/app/briefs/bethelbrief.pdf; First Amended Complaint at 7-13,
Bethel World Outreach Ministries v. Montgomery Cnty. Council, No. 08-1195 (D. Md. Jan. 28, 2010)
on file with authorss).
0 First Amended Complaint at 10-11, Bethel World Outreach Ministries v. Montgomery Cnty. Council, No. 08-1195 (D. Md. Jan. 28, 2010) (on file with authors).
231 Moxley v. Town of Walkersville, 601 F. Supp. 2d 648, 653 (D. Md. 2009).
232 Lauren Ciraulo, O.B. Looking to Change House of Worship Zoning, Changes Will Impact Pending
Plans
by
Religious
Groups,
SUBURBAN
(Sept.
29,
2010),
available
at
http://sub.gmnews.com/news/2010-0923/Front Page/0Blooking tochange house of worship zoning.html ('Recent applications for houses of worship have brought to our attention that certain sections of the LDO may be interpreted by applications in ways other than what was intended. Several sections have been called into question,' [Township Planner Sam] Rizzo said in an August report on the issue.") (on file with authors).
233 Sam Slaughter, Religious Group's Plan Denied in Old Bridge, SUBURBAN (May 12, 2011), available
at
hftp://sub.gmnews.com/news/2011-05-
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least establish a prima facie case of discrimination.234
It was well established in pre-RLUIPA Free Exercise jurisprudence that
laws specifically targeting religious conduct have an "impermissible object"
and are not constitutional.235 In Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., the
Supreme Court reviewed the principle that, "the protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law at issue discriminates against some or all religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits conduct because it is undertaken for
religious reasons." 236 Further, "[a] law targeting religious beliefs as such is
never permissible."237 The equal application of the law is paramount, and
when disposing of applications made by unpopular groups, "[t]hose in office must be resolute in resisting importunate demands and must ensure that
the sole reasons for imposing the burdens of law and regulation are secular.
Legislators may not devise mechanisms, overt or disguised, designed to
persecute or oppress a religion or its practices."238 The Nondiscrimination
provision encompasses these existing Free Exercise principles.
The Court first contemplated the concept of a "religious gerrymander"
that might target religious activity in Justice Harlan's concurrence in Walz
v. Tax Commissioners of New York.239 There, a plaintiff challenged certain
tax exemptions for worship facilities on establishment clause grounds.240
The Court held that the history of "the Religion Clauses" made clear that
such exemptions did not lead to unconstitutional entanglement.241 Justice
Harlan highlighted the "mutually reinforcing" concepts of neutrality and
voluntarism that defend against government over-involvement in religious
matters. 242 He further explained that
[n]eutrality in its application requires an equal protection mode of analysis. The
Court must survey meticulously the circumstances of governmental categories
to eliminate, as it were, religious gerrymanders. In any particular case the critical question is whether the circumference of legislation encircles a class so
broad that it can be fairly concluded that religious institutions could be thought

12/Front Page/Religious groupsplan denied in Old Bridge.html.
234 Compare St. John's United Church of Christ v. City of Chi., 401 F. Supp. 2d 887, 898
(N.D. Ill.
2005) ("Plaintiffs do not allege that Chicago wanted the legislature to pass § 30 so that it could satisfy a
goal of impeding the St. John's Plaintiffs religious practice by building runways over St. Johannes Cemetery."), w1ith Ciraulo, supra, note 232.
235 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 524 (1993).
236 Id. at 532.
237 Id. at 533.
238 Id. at 547.

239 Walz v. Tax Comm'rs of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
240 Id. at 667.
241 Id. at 680.
242 Id. at 694.
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2 43
to fall within the natural perimeter.

This "zone of effect" of challenged legislation has thus become one of
the primary inquiries in cases alleging religious gerrymanders. While Justice Harlan was concerned with avoiding Establishment Clause violations
by considering the natural scope of legislation, the inquiry has also been
applied in the reverse to ensure that legislation does not single out particular
sects or particular religious entities.244
The Supreme Court applied that inquiry in City of Hialeah, where a Santeria group leased property with the intent to construct a worship facility.245
The practice of the Santeria faith includes animal sacrifice.246 After learning of the group's plans, the city council passed four ordinances and two
hortatory statements intended to prevent the group from conducting its worship or animal sacrifices within the city.247 All of these were framed as
general animal welfare laws, although curiously they were either limited to
ritual sacrifice or else contained specific exemptions for commercial
slaughterhouses.248
After a bench trial, the District Court held that, although the ordinances
were prompted by the group's arrival in the city and were not religiously
neutral, "the purpose of the ordinances was not to exclude the Church from
the city but to end the practice of animal sacrifice, for whatever reason practiced."249 Further, because the ordinances did not facially target religious
conduct, and were ostensibly to preserve the public health and welfare, any
burden on the group's religious exercise was incidental.250 The court balanced the church's interests against four interests proffered by the government to determine whether those governmental interests were sufficiently
compelling.251 Relying in part on the government's stated interest in "emotional injury to children who witness the sacrifice of animals," the district
court found that the ordinances passed strict scrutiny review.252
The Supreme Court disagreed, applying free exercise jurisprudence to
determine that, despite their facial neutrality, the ordinances targeted the
2431d. at 696.
244 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 525 (1993).
245 Id. at 525-26.
2 46
Id at 525.
247 Id. at 527-28.
248 Id.
249 Id. at 529.
250 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 529 (1993).
251 Id. at 529-30.
252 Id. at 530.
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Santeria faith.253 Citing Walz, the Court held that "[o]fficial action that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment cannot be shielded by mere
compliance with the requirement of facial neutrality."254 Importantly,
"[a]part from the text, the effect of a law in its real operation is strong evidence of its object."255 Although the government identified legitimate interests protected by the ordinances, "the ordinances when considered together
disclose an object remote from these legitimate concerns." 256 Because the
ordinances targeted religious conduct, they amounted to a religious gerrymander.257 Essential to the Court's conclusion was the context and effect of
the ordinances: "It is a necessary conclusion that almost the only conduct
subject to [the ordinances] is the religious exercise of Santeria church
members." 258
Referring to its equal protection analysis in City ofArlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation,259 the Court noted that the
context considered should include, "among other things, the historical
background of the decision under challenge, the specific series of events
leading to the enactment or official policy in question, and the legislative or
administrative history, including contemporaneous statements made by
members of the decisionmaking body."260 The Court specifically reviewed
transcripts of public hearings, as discussed supra.261 Because the context
and effect of the ordinances evidenced a religious gerrymander, the ordinances were deemed not to be neutral.262 Further, by permitting conduct
that conflicted with the stated governmental interests, the ordinances were
not of general applicability, and subsequently did not survive strict scrutiny
review.263

The only RLUIPA Nondiscrimination case to explicitly allege religious
gerrymandering involved a Hasidic Jewish group seeking to construct a
boys' boarding school.264 In United States v. Village of Airmont, the Department of Justice filed a facial challenge and an as-applied challenge to
253

Id. at 535.
254 Id. at 534.
2551d at 535.
256 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 535 (1993).
257 Id.
258 Id.

259
260
261
262
263
264

City of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 426 U.S. 252 (1977).
Church ofLukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 535 (1992).
Id. at 540-541.
Id. at 542.
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 542, 546 (1993).
United States v. Vill. ofAirmont, No. 05-5520, at 3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2008).
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the Village's zoning code, which had totally prohibited boarding schools.265
It was alleged that living on campus was an important part of the pedagogical structure of the school.266 The area constituting the Village had previously been part of the Town of Ramapo, New York, which allowed for the
construction of these schools, but its residents had seceded. 267 Additionally,
in a prior case, the Second Circuit had held that there was sufficient evidence to find that the Village's zoning code was motivated by antiSemitism.268 Although the prohibition on boarding schools predated the
Hasidic Jewish group's application, the court found that "the language [of
the zoning code] suggests that the Code's drafters were seeking to prohibit
religious schools, and perhaps yeshivas in particular, when they wrote this
provision."269 Thus, in this case, the intent of the drafters, as inferred
through the history of the zoning code, was so strong as to nullify the temporal requirement usually found in such cases. 270
In 2010, the Fourth Circuit affirmed a jury finding of religious discrimination in Reaching Hearts International,Inc. v. Prince George's County, a

RLUIPA challenge to, inter alia, a zoning amendment that allegedly restricted religious land use. 2 7 1 The plaintiff was a Seventh Day Adventist
group that sought to construct a worship facility and school on land it had
purchased.272 The County denied its application for a water and sewer category change-the only denial out of twenty-eight applications considered at
that particular meeting.273 The group had previously faced community opposition at a meeting it held to introduce neighbors to its project.274 Additionally, the circumstances surrounding the denial of the application were
suspect: the County Council initially voted for the approval of the application, but after Councilman Dernoga "was observed to have said something
to the other council members, who then reversed themselves and voted
against [the church's] application."275
After reworking its application for resubmission, the church learned
Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 4 n.1.
268 Id. at 4 (citing Leblanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 67 F.3d 412, 416 (2d Cir. 1995)).
2691d. at 18.
270 United States v. Vill. ofAirmont, No. 05-5520, slip op. at 18 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2008).
271 Reaching Hearts Int'l, Inc. v. Prince George's Cnty., 368 Fed. Appx. 370, 373 (4th Cir. 2010).
272 Reaching Hearts Int'l, Inc. v. Prince George's Cnty., 584 F. Supp. 2d 766, 772 (D. Md. 2008), affd,
368 Fed. Appx. 370 (4th Cir. 2010).
2731d. at 775.
274 Id. at 773.
275 Id. at 775.
265

266
267
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of an ordinance sponsored by Councilman Dernoga and passed by the
County Council four months after the denial of the church's application. 276
That ordinance "dramatically reduced the allowable net lot coverage for
certain non-residential use properties in residential zones that were within
2,500 feet of a drinking water reservoir from 50% and 60% to 10% and
20%."277 The only non-residential uses in that zone were church and elementary schools. 278 Further, the drafter of the ordinance "testified that he
was unaware of any other property in Councilman Dernoga's district that
would have been affected by the terms of [the ordinance]."279 The effect of
the ordinance was to make construction of the Reaching Hearts church impossible,280 and the church continued its futile attempt to file application after application to develop the property. 281
After filing suit, the church prevailed in a jury trial against the County. 282
The district court found that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of intentional discrimination.283 Specifically, "the historical
background, the specific sequence of events leading up to the Defendant's
actions (including numerous departures from normal procedures), and the
contemporary statements of decision-makers all amply supported the jury's
reasonable finding of intentional discrimination." 28 4 Among the evidence
adduced at trial that related to these factors were statements made by members of the County Council to the press at the same time that the application
was pending .25 Importantly, the district court also found that the sequence
of events leading to the passage of the ordinance, "which effectively foreclosed [Reaching Heart's] ability to build a church on its property," was introduced just two months after the denial of the first water and sewer permit, and contained a restriction "just large enough to encompass all of [the
church's] property" but did not affect any other properties, all supported an
inference of targeting.286 As in City ofHialeah, "[t]he inference that Reach276 Id. at 776.
277 Id.at 772.
278 Reaching Hearts Int'l, Inc. v. Prince George's Cnty., 584 F. Supp. 2d 766, 772 (D. Md. 2008), aff'd,
368 Fed. Appx. 370 (4th Cir. 2010).
279 Id
280 Id

281 Id. at 778-79.
282 Id. at 782.
2831d at 781-82.
284 Reaching Hearts Int'l, Inc. v. Prince George's Cnty., 584 F. Supp. 2d 766, 781-82 (D. Md. 2008),
aff'd, 368 Fed. Appx. 370 (4th Cir. 2010).
285 Id. at 782. The district court rejected the County's position that these statements should not factor
into the analysis because they were not strictly "on the record or in minutes of their meetings," as considered in Arlington Heights. Id. at 783.
286 Id.at 779.
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ing Hearts was uniquely targeted by this bill is buttressed by the inconsistency in the purported motivation for the bill and the reality of its drafting" which contained serious flaws.287
Plaintiff Reaching Hearts had advanced an equal protection claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a substantial burden claim under RLUIPA.288 The
district court reviewed the factors for discerning intentional discrimination
derived by the Fourth Circuit in its own interpretation of the City ofArlington Heights factors:
(1) evidence of a 'consistent pattern' of actions by the decision-making body
disparately impacting members of a particular class of persons (2) historical
background of the decision, which may take into account any history of discrimination by the decision-making body or the jurisdiction it represents (3)
the specific sequence of events leading up to the particular decision being challenged. including any significant departures from normal procedures and (4)
contemporary statements by decision-makers on the record or in minutes of
289
their meetings.

The lower court further reviewed each party's burden of proof, noting
that the initial burden was on the plaintiff to show "intentional or purposeful discrimination."290 Once it did so, the burden shifted to the defendant in
the equal protection analysis "to articulate a compelling governmental interest and that its actions taken were narrowly tailored to further that compelling governmental interest."291 The court next highlighted the main advantage that the Nondiscrimination provision provides: "Because CB-832003 is a facially neutral ordinance, RHI bears the burden of demonstrating
an intent on the part of the Defendant to purposefully discriminate against
it."292 To the contrary, under RLUIPA, the municipality bears the burden of
persuasion to demonstrate that its targeted ordinance does not discriminate
against the plaintiff.293 Nonetheless, in Reaching Hearts the church met its
burden. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court, citing a
Title VII case and noting that, when "[v]iewed in the light most favorable to
Reaching Hearts, the evidence presented at trial of the County's anti-church

286 Id at 783.
287 Id.
288 Id. at 780-81 (although a showing of intentional discrimination was necessary for the church to
maintain its equal protection claim, it did not assert a RLUIPA Nondiscrimination claim).
2891d.at 781.
290 Reaching Hearts Int'l, Inc. v. Prince George's Cnty., 584 F. Supp. 2d 766, 781 (D. Md. 2008), affd,
368 Fed. Appx. 370 (4th Cir. 2010).
291

Id.

292 Id.
293 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000cc-2(b)

(2006).
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animus was very strong." 294
Against this background, a prima facie Nondiscrimination claim can
be made by demonstrating that a plaintiff s religious land use was the object
of a particular zoning or landmarking ordinance or that the particularized
effect of the law is such that the only or almost the only affected landowner
is the religious group at issue. Once the plaintiff meets that threshold, the
burden must shift to the defendant municipality to show that the law is not
only facially neutral but also was not intended to target a specific religious

group or denomination.295
C. Selective Enforcement
The unequal application of an otherwise facially neutral statute is
one of the most commonly understood types of discrimination.296 In the
context of racial discrimination, the Supreme Court has held that "[a] statute, otherwise neutral on its face, must not be applied so as invidiously to
discriminate . . . ."297 The identification of comparators is critical for a
claim that a local government has treated a religious entity differently and
worse than other religious entities.298 The Supreme Court has described the
McDonnell Douglas test simply as the "burden-shifting scheme for discriminatory-treatment cases." 299 Elsewhere, it has noted that "[t]he burden of
establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous. The
plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she applied for
an available position for which she was qualified, but was rejected under
circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination."300 The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting test should be applied to

these types of claims, particularly since a municipality will likely be able to
identify some criteria differing between the aggrieved applicant and the
identified comparator, as no two applicants will be identical.

294 Reaching Hearts Int'l, Inc. v. Prince George's Cnty., 368 Fed. Appx. 370, 372 (4th Cir. 2010).
295 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b) (2006).
296 See, e.g., Church of Scientology of Ga., Inc. v. City of Sandy Springs, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1361
(N.D. Ga. 2012).
297 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976) (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)).
298 The Equal Terms provision is implicated if a religious entity is treated differently and worse than
other nonreligious entities. Also, it should be noted that the authors have yet to observe a circumstance
where a traditional mainstream church alleged mistreatment as compared to a nontraditional place of
worship.
299 Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 50 n.3 (2003).
300 Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
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In one case predating RLUIPA, the plaintiff group needed only to look
next door to find a religious group receiving better treatment.301 In Islamic
Center of Mississippi, Inc. v. City of Starkville, a Muslim group searched

for more than a year to locate an appropriate site for a worship center within
walking distance of the University of Mississippi, since many of the students did not own cars. 302 Pursuant to the city's zoning code, any location
near the university would require a special exception from the City Board
of Aldermen (the "Board").303 The Center entered into a dialogue with the
Board, who rejected several of the group's informal choices for houses of
worship, presented before the group purchased them.304 Finally, the Center
located a suitable property and was told by a member of the Board that it
was an "excellent location" for the proposed use. 3 05 Later, after the group
had purchased the property and expended significant funds in construction,
the Board unanimously rejected the exception without explanation.306
The group filed suit, alleging violation of the Free Exercise
Clause. 307 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit carefully examined the context of
the denial of the exception for the group. 308 It noted that since the inception
of the zoning provisions requiring groups to obtain special exceptions, all
nine previous applicants had been approved. 309 Each of those applicants
(along with the other sixteen churches that existed in the neighborhood prior to the enactment of the zoning code) were Christian churches.310 One of
them was located next door to the space sought by the Muslim group. 311
Although the city cited "parking" concerns as a reason for denying the
Muslim center, the appeals court noted that the neighboring church attracted
"more than twice as many persons" as the services at the Muslim center,
and that the Muslim center planned to provide ten more parking spaces than
its neighbor.312 The Fifth Circuit held that "[t]he City's approval of applications for zoning exceptions by other churches suggests that it did not treat
all applicants alike. This undermines the City's contention that the Board
denied a zoning exception to the Muslims solely for the purposes of traffic
301

Islamic Ctr. of Miss., Inc. v. City of Starkville, 840 F.2d 293, 295 (5th Cir. 1988).

302
303

Id
Id. at 294.
3 04
Id. at 295.
305 Id.
3 06
Id at 296.
307 Islamic Ctr. of Miss., Inc. v. City of Starkville, 840 F.2d 293, 298 (5th Cir. 1988).
308 Id
309 Id. at 297.
310 Id
311 Id.
312 Id. at 297.
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control and public safety."313 The court then found the zoning ordinance
unconstitutional as applied to the Center.314
Had the case been brought after the passage of RLUIPA, the plaintiff
would have established a prima facie Nondiscrimination claim by demonstrating that its use had been rejected while other places of worship had
been permitted to locate in the same zoning district under the same statutory
scheme. The burden of persuasion would then have fallen on the defendant
to demonstrate that the reasons for its disparate treatment were not pretextual, a burden it likely would not have been able to meet in this case.
Therefore, the extension of the McDonnell Douglas analysis generally
would not pose a fundamental change to the analysis; it would merely make
cases more manageable and predictable for litigants and courts.
In Adhi ParasakthiCharitable,Medical, Educational,and CulturalSoci-

ety of North America,315 the plaintiff Hindu organization sought "conditional use" approval to expand its facilities.316 The zoning board held eight
public hearings on the proposal, 317 and then purported to approve the application but included conditions that completely frustrated the purposes of the
application, leading the district court to find that, "[i]n effect, therefore, the
Board denied Plaintiffs application."318 The group thereafter filed suit, including a Nondiscrimination claim that the defendant municipality's zoning
ordinance was arbitrarily enforced against it.319 The Eastern District of
Pennsylvania found that the plaintiff had provided evidence that "other,
non-Hindu groups that did not require such an extensive [zoning] process,"
and that the group asserted "that there was an undue focus on 'small technical issues,' and that Defendant repeatedly added new reasons to the list of
why the application could not be approved after engineering changes had
been made. These obstacles, according to Plaintiff, were not faced by other
applicants."320 In the face of Defendant's facts, Plaintiffs arguments created a genuine issue of fact and thus summary judgment was inappropriate on
Plaintiffs' Free Exercise and Nondiscrimination claims.321 The court found
313 Islamic Ctr. of Miss., Inc. v. City of Starkville, 840 F.2d 293, 302 (5th Cir. 1988).
314 Id. at 303.
315 Adhi Parasakthi Charitable, Med., Educ., & Cultural Soc'y of N. Am. v. Twp. of W. Pikeland,
721
F. Supp. 2d 361, 370-71 (E.D. Pa. 2010).
316 Id. at 371.
317 Id.
318 Id.
319 Id. at 378.
320 Id.

321 Adhi Parasakthi Charitable, Med., Educ., & Cultural Soc'y of N. Am. v. Twp. of W. Pikeland, 721
F. Supp. 2d 361, 378, 386 (E.D. Pa. 2010).
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that the ordinance was not facially discriminatory, but that it was "possible,
however, that this Ordinance was applied to target religiously motivated
conduct."322 The identification of sufficient comparators contributed to the
existence of a fact-question of pretext. 32 3
Similarly, in Hollywood Community Synagogue, Inc. v. City of Holly-

wood, the court applied a selective enforcement theory to deny the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiffs Nondiscrimination claim.324 The
plaintiff group had purchased two adjacent single-family homes, which
were zoned such that a Worship Special Exception permit was required in
order to operate a worship facility out of one of the homes. 325 Despite assurances from city officials that the permit would be granted, the group was
granted temporary permits, but its application was ultimately denied after
one of the city commissioners filed an appeal challenging the permit.326
The reviewing body "determined that the Synagogue was 'too controversial,' despite the fact that 'controversiality' was not an enumerated factor in
the City Code to be evaluated when considering a Special Exception."327
The court reviewed evidence of three types of comparators submitted by the
plaintiff.328 Specifically, there were nineteen houses of worship in the area,
including two other synagogues that had obtained the necessary Special Exception permit.329 There was also a shrine located only a few blocks away
from the proposed synagogue site, which had been operating for more than
a decade without obtaining the Special Exception permit.330 There was yet
another non-Jewish house of worship that had operated without a Special
Exception permit without incident "until after the Synagogue inquired about
unequal treatment[;] this house of worship applied for and was immediately
granted a Special Exception."331 Additionally, the plaintiff asserted that of
the ten other applications for such permits submitted in the last twenty
years, only the plaintiffs application had been denied.332 This was suffi322 Id. at 378.
323 See also Bikur Cholim, Inc. v. Vill. of Suffern, 664 F. Supp. 2d 267, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting
that the plaintiffs evidence of comparators in its consideration of whether the facially neutral zoning, if
unequally applied as evidenced by the treatment comparators, gave rise to a RLUIPA claim).
324 Hollywood Cmty. Synagogue, Inc. v. City of Hollywood, 430 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1320-21 (S.D. Fla.
2006).
325 Id at 1300.
3 26
1d at 1300-1301.
327 Id. at 1301.
3 28
1d at 1301-02.
329 Id at 1302.
330 Hollywood Cmty. Synagogue, Inc. v. City of Hollywood, 430 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1302-03 (S.D. Fla.
2006).
331 Id. at 1303.
332 Id.

2013]1

CIVIL RIGHTS AND RLUIPA

341

cient to maintain the Nondiscrimination claim:
[I]t adequately connected the alleged discrimination with HCS's religious affiliation by identifying HCS as a religious institution, describing how the City of
Hollywood denied it a Special Exception and sought to prevent religious wor-

ship there, and identifying the City's implementation of a time limit on HCS's
Special Exception and the City's ultimate denial of a permanent Special Exception as the first such measures ever imposed on a religious institution by the
City. 333

The denial of the permit application and "the selective enforcement
against the Synagogue" were the most significant facts influencing the
court's decision.334 Again, the court applied an abbreviated test in which
the court treated the prima facie case, the defendant's reason for denying
the permit, and the showing of pretext through comparators at the same
time.335
In Church of Scientology of Georgia, Inc. v. City of Sandy Springs, the

Northern District of Georgia made a thorough and instructive investigation
of adequate comparators before finding that a fact question existed as to the
selective enforcement of parking regulations.336 The plaintiff church argued
that
The City has discriminated against the Church, not only by refusing to apply its
own parking ordinance to the Church. but also by applying a different parking

standard than it has applied to every other church or place of worship in its jurisdictional boundaries. The City approved parking variances to reduce the required parking required for other places of worship in the City. while imposing
a parking requirement on the Church of Scientology that amounts to almost
337
three (3) times the parking required by the City's Zoning Ordinance.

In support of its allegations, the plaintiff alleged that there were eleven
comparators that had been treated more favorably by the City with respect
to the relevant land use regulations.338 Although the group had been assured
by city officials that the site contained sufficient parking, the City later decided that the parking was not sufficient based on applying different standards to the church.339
To define its prima facie case for a selective enforcement claim, the court
3 33

Id. at 1320-21.
Id. at 1321.
335
Id. at 1323, 1327.
336 Church of Scientology of Ga., Inc. v. City of Sandy Springs, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1376 (N.D. Ga.
2012).
33 Id. at 1362.
338 Id.
3 39
Id. at 1342-43.
3 34
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borrowed from an Eleventh Circuit equal protection case that did not involve the exercise of fundamental rights. 340 It held that the "Plaintiff must
show: (1) that it was treated differently from other similarly situated religious assemblies or institutions, and (2) that the City unequally applied a
facially neutral ordinance for the purpose of discriminating against Plaintiff."341
The court examined the comparators identified by the plaintiff
based on whether they would have similar uses in addition to the congregational worship; that is, "they must have sought rezoning approval for a primary use in addition to their 'church' use (defined by the Zoning Ordinance
as an 'assembly-type use'), that would necessitate application of the [different parking standards]."342 The plaintiff was able to show at least one comparator who operated a school and was permitted to meet its parking requirements through an off-site shared parking arrangement without a
variance, as was required of the plaintiff.343
The court also reviewed the factors that might be used to show circumstantial evidence of intentional discrimination, including the
(1) historical background of the decision, particularly if it reveals a series of official actions taken for invidious purposes, (2) the specific sequence of events
leading up to the challenged decision. (3) departures from the normal procedural sequence, as well as substantive departures, (4) legislative or administrative
history. especially where there are contemporary statements by members of the
decision-making body. minutes of its meetings, or reports, (5) foreseeability of
discriminatory impact. (6) knowledge of discriminatory impact. and (7) the
34 4
availability of less discriminatory alternatives.

Framing these within the general equal protection context, the court noted that the plaintiff argued that it was subjected to a lengthier approval process than other churches. 345 After reviewing all of the evidence, the court
found that the plaintiff had made its prima facie case, and that the defendant
had presented evidence that any departures were related to legitimate nondiscriminatory objectives.346 The court reasoned that summary judgment
340 Id. at 1370-71 (citing Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455, 1485-86 (11th Cir. 1983)).
341 Id. at 1361; see also Campbell v. Rainbow City, 434 F.3d 1306, 1314 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Strickland v. Alderman, 74 F.3d 260, 264 (11th Cir. 1996)).
342 The plaintiff also intended to locate classrooms and offices at the site. Id. at 1364.
343
Id. at 1365-66, 1369.
344 Id. at 1371 (citing Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266-68
(1977); Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455, 1486 (11th Cir. 1983); see also Reaching Hearts Int'l, Inc. v.
Prince George's Cnty., 584 F. Supp. 2d 766, 781 (D. Md. 2008) (recognizing several factors the Fourth
Circuit used to determine whether a decision-making entity acted based on discriminatory intent).
345 Church of Scientology of Ga., Inc. v. City of Sandy Springs, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1372-73 (N.D.
Ga. 2012).
3 46
Id. at 1375-76.
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was inappropriate because a reasonable fact-finder could determine that any
discrimination was unintentional. 347
The Church of Scientology framework suggests an effective method for
analyzing a Nondiscrimination claim based on selective enforcement.
Meeting the first prong by showing a more favorably treated comparator, 348
should constitute a sufficient prima facie case. Applying the McDonnell
Douglas analysis to this method, the burden would then shift to the defendant to show a nondiscriminatory explanation for the differential treatment.
These explanations should be made in terms of the neutral regulatory purposes for which the ordinances were originally implemented. Finally, the
plaintiff should have the opportunity to show that these reasons were pretextual. It will be particularly important that courts not equate "intentional"
discrimination with direct evidence of discrimination, as some courts have
done.

D. Disparate Impact
The disparate impact of facially neutral laws or practices may also
demonstrate discrimination on the basis of religion or religious denomination. Even as it found RFRA to be unconstitutional, the Supreme Court allowed for the possibility of appropriate disparate impact claims in the area
of religious discrimination, noting that "[i]f a state law disproportionately
burdened a particular class of religious observers, this circumstance might
be evidence of an impermissible legislative motive."349
The Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Company, one of its earli-

est cases interpreting Title VII, announced the theory of discrimination
shown through disparate impact.350 In Griggs, the defendant power compa347 Id. at 1376.

348 How a valid comparator is determined is a separate question. The obiective standards employed in
the Equal Terms context by the Fifth and Seventh Circuits in River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill.
of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 376, 371 (7th Cir. 2010) ("accepted zoning criteria.") and Elijah Grp., Inc. v.
City of Leon Valley, 643 F.3d 419, 424 (5th Cir. 2011) ("measured by the ordinance itself and the criteria by which it treats institutions differently.") are preferable for the reasons described above. See River
ofLife Kingdom Ministries, 611 F.3d at 371 ("The problems that we have identified with the Third Circuit's test can be solved by a shift of focus from regulatory purpose to accepted zoning criteria. The shift
is not merely semantic. 'Purpose' is subjective and manipulable, so asking about 'regulatory purpose'
might result in giving local officials a free hand in answering the question 'equal with respect to what?'
'Regulatory criteria' are objective-and it is federal judges who will apply the criteria to resolve the
issue.").
349 City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535 (1971).
350 See generally Griggs v. Duke Power, Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1974).
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ny had engaged in overtly discriminatory policies prior to the enactment of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.351 African American employees had been
hired only for the power plant's Labor Department, which provided the
least desirable work of the plant's five departments. 352 After the passage of
the Civil Rights Act, the plant began permitting African American employees to transfer to the more desirable departments, provided that they were
high-school graduates or if they obtained satisfactory scores on two intelligence tests. 3 53 Significantly, the fact that the company's implementation of
these requirements was not motivated by any intent to discriminate was undisputed.354 Yet, the Court found decisively that the implementation of the
requirements was not related to job performance since it was not disputed
that employees hired prior to the implementation of the requirements were
able to perform their jobs satisfactorily.355 The Court cited statistics that
demonstrated that a significantly lower percentage of African American
men in North Carolina, the state in which the plant was located, had graduated from high school, and that a significantly lower percentage of AfricanAmerican employees taking the intelligence tests achieved a satisfactory
score. 356
The Court noted that after the passage of the Civil Rights Act, "practices,
procedure, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent,
cannot be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practice."357 It held that "if an employment practice which operates to exclude [African Americans] cannot be shown to be
related to job performance, the practice is prohibited[:]358 any tests used
must measure the person for the job and not the person in the abstract." 359
Later versions of Title VII codified the Griggs holding.360 The current
version of the law sets forth the burden of proof in employment discrimination cases based on disparate impact:
(1)(A) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is established under this subchapter only if--

351 Id. at 426-27.
352 Id. at 427.

353 Id. at 428.
3 54
Id. at 432.
355
Id. at 431.
356 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 n. 6. (1947).
357 Id. at 430.
3 58
Id. at 431.
3 59
Id. at 436.
360 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1074-75 (adding 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)).
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(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular
employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex. or national origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity; or
(ii) the complaining party makes the demonstration described in subparagraph (C) with respect to an alternative employment practice and the
respondent refuses to adopt such alternative employment practice. 361

In Smith v. City ofJackson, the Supreme Court held that disparate impact
claims could be brought under the ADEA.362 The congressional purpose
behind the ADEA is "to promote employment of older persons based on
their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems
arising from the impact of age on employment." 3 63 The Court reviewed its
holding in Griggs and focused on the identical language in Title VII and the
ADEA prohibiting conduct that would "'deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individuals' race or age. . . ."364 Thus, the text focuses on
the effects of the action on the employee rather than the motivation for the
action of the employer."365 The textual differences between the post-1991
Civil Rights Act and the ADEA led the Court to define the scope of an
ADEA disparate impact case narrowly: "it is not enough to simply allege
that there is a disparate impact on workers, or point to a generalized policy
that leads to such an impact. Rather, the employee is 'responsible for isolating and identifying the specific employment practices that are allegedly
responsible for any observed statistical disparities."366
Disparate impact claims are particularly useful in the RLUIPA Nondiscrimination context because, like the tests at issue in Griggs, zoning laws
are often designed to maintain the status quo, the effect of which is to keep
out the very faith groups-unfamiliar and disfavored religious organiza361 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-2(k)

(2006). This section was created by Congress in the 1991 amendments to

the Civil Rights Act, and the demonstration referenced in the second half of the quoted portion is a reference to an earlier version of the Civil Rights Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2006). A leading expert
in labor law explains that Section (1)(A)(ii) refers to a plaintiff proving the availability of an alternative
employment practice which the employer refuses to adopt. Rosemary Alito, "Disparate Impact Discrimination Under the 1991 Civil Rights Act," 45 RUT. L. R. 1011, 1017 (1993).
362 Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005) (holding that ADEA and Title VII "both ...
authorize recovery on a disparate-impact theory . . . .

363 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (2006).
364 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
365
See City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 235.
366 Id at 241 (quoting Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656 (1989)) (quoting Watson
v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 991 (1988)) (emphasis in original).
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tions-that RLUIPA was designed to protect. For example, in Cambodian
Buddhist Society of Connecticut, Inc. v. Planning and Zoning Commission
of the Town of Newtown, the defendant planning and zoning commission

denied the plaintiff s application for a special exception to build a Buddhist
temple on property it had purchased.367 The property was located in a farming and residential zone which permitted places of religious worship by
special exception.368 The proposed structure was to be a traditional Buddhist design.369 Among other reasons, the defendant commission found that
the traditional Buddhist design of the temple would impair property values
and was not in harmony with the design of other buildings in the neighborhood.370 Clearly, while the code provisions may not have been adopted
with discriminatory intent, even if they were applied in a neutral manner
(i.e., if the architectural design of the Buddhist temple was in fact not in
harmony with surrounding buildings), such application would discriminate
"on the basis of religion." Church architecture is imbued with religious
significance,371 and to permit simple Christian churches that are deemed to
fit within a New England community while prohibiting an unfamiliar Buddhist design is to engage in religious discrimination.
In accordance with Senators Hatch and Kennedy's statement that
RLUIPA should serve as a shield in situations where "discrimination lurks
behind such vague and universally applicable reasons as traffic [or] aesthetics," RLUIPA's definition of religious exercise provides that "[t]he use,
building, or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious exercise
shall be considered to be religious exercise of the person or entity that uses
or intends to use the property for that purpose." 372 In short, RLUIPA pro367 Cambodian Buddhist Soc'y of Conn., Inc. v. Planning & Zonning Comm'n of Newtown, 285 Conn.

381, 384 (2008).
368 Id. at 386.
369 Id. at 387.

370 Id. at 387-88 (in order to qualify for a special exception the use "shall not substantially impair property values in the neighborhood" and any "architectural design of the proposed buildings shall be in
harmony with the design of other buildings in the neighborhood.").
371 See, e.g., First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle, 120 Wash. 2d 203, 217 (1992) ("First
Covenant claims, and no one disputes, that its church building itself 'is an expression of Christian belief
and message' and that conveying religious beliefs is part of the building's function."); Angela C. Carmella, Houses of Worship and Religious Liberty: ConstitutionalLimits to Landmark Preservationand

ArchitecturalReview, 36 VILL. L. REv. 401, 450 (1991) ("Ecclesiastical structures reify particular theological, moral and social assertions. They express, among other things, the religious community's purpose, theology, identity, hope, unity and reverence for the divine and its identification with or separation
from certain aspects of the culture." (footnotes omitted)); Thomas Pak, Free Exercise, Free Expression,
and Landmarks Preservation, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1813, 1840-41 (1991) ("Religious architecture,
through its shapes, symbols, decorations, ornamentations, and monumentality, represents a strong intention to communicate a particularized message about a group's religious beliefs." (footnotes omitted)).
372 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(B) (2006); 146 CONG. REC. S7774-01 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint
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vides for the commonsense understanding that Buddhist religious practice
may include worshipping in a building with traditional Buddhist features.
By stating that such a building is inappropriate for the neighborhood and
further deciding that a Buddhist worship center would impair property values, the zoning commission effectively finds that Buddhism is incompatible
with the neighborhood.
Despite this, the Connecticut Supreme Court appeared to reject
RLUIPA's rule of construction: RLUIPA "shall be construed in favor of a
broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by
the terms of this Act and the Constitution."373 It accepted the zoning commission's lip service that "'[d]iversity of religion should be encouraged in
Newtown,' and . . . '[the Commission hoped] that the [society] could find

property more suitable to [the temple's] needs,"'374 presumably where Buddhist architecture would be "in harmony" with the surrounding neighborhood, if any such place exists.
A disparate impact theory could have resolved this issue, even where that
court was "satisfied that the commission's concerns were motivated not by
religious bigotry but by neutral considerations that it would apply equally to
any proposed use of the property," and "[n]othing in the record establishes
that .

.

. the reasons that the commission gave for denying the society's ap-

plication were pretextual or otherwise designed to conceal an unlawful discriminatory intent."375 Many "facially neutral" land use restrictions on the
location and construction of places of worship may discriminate against
certain religions or forms of religious exercise. For example, a minimum or
maximum lot size requirement of several acres could effectively ban either
small churches or "megachurches" from a jurisdiction because the acreage
requirement would render construction of an appropriate place of worship
impossible.376 Prohibiting churches from downtown retail or commercial
zoning districts eliminates the possibility of a church that seeks to minister
to the homeless or other at-risk populations in such areas and thus favors
those religious groups that do not undertake such ministry.377 While such
statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy).
37 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g) (2006).
374 Cambodian Buddhist Soc'y of Conn., Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n of Newtown, 285 Conn.
381, 388 (2008).
375
Id. at 421-22.
376 See, e.g., Covenant Christian Ministries v. City of Marietta, 654 F.3d 1231, 1236 (11th Cir. 2011)
(City prohibited houses of worship in zoning district rather than eliminating 5-acre minimum lot size
requirement for houses of worship); Freedom Baptist Church v. Twp. of Middletown, 204 F. Supp. 2d
857, 859 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (challenging zoning requirement that houses of worship locate on lots of at
least five acres).
3 Christian Assembly Rios de Agua Viva v. City of Burbank, 948 N.E.2d 251, 254 (111.App. 2011)
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laws may also violate the Equal Terms provision if nonreligious institutional or assembly uses remain unregulated in the same manner, they could also
violate the Nondiscrimination provision if their effect is to favor certain religions or religious denominations over others.
The parallels between such cases and Griggs are obvious. The company
owner in Griggs maintained that he had instituted the high-school diploma
requirement and intelligence tests based "on the Company's judgment that
they generally would improve the quality of the work force."378 That only
12% of African American men in North Carolina (compared to 34% of
Caucasian men) had graduated high school in 1960, and only 6% passed the
intelligence tests (compared to 58% of the whites), due to the inferior educational opportunities, was incidental to the company. 379 Similarly, local
governments may have certain views on how places of worship should look
and where they should be located. In both cases, such "facially neutral" requirements have the necessary effect of keeping out the affected populations that Title VII or RLUIPA were intended to aid.380
V. CONCLUSION

Religious groups, especially new and minority faiths, continue to
face discrimination in the context of land use regulation across the United
States. Without specific standards to guide practitioners and courts,
RLUIPA's Nondiscrimination provision has been underutilized as a tool to
ensure equal opportunities for religious worship. Groups that have chosen
to bring these claims have been unable to ascertain what evidence or process is necessary to achieve favorable outcomes, and, unsurprisingly, such
outcomes have been rare. By looking to other areas of the law, with established statutory constructions for discrimination claims, practitioners and
courts can gain the predictability and structure necessary to proper adjudication of RLUIPA Nondiscrimination claims.

(indicating that zoning ordinance restricted uses in the commercial zone to those that would generate tax
revenue); Digrugilliers v. Consol. City of Indianapolis, 506 F.3d 612, 614-17 (7th Cir. 2007) (explaining
that neither existence of alternative rural locations nor possibility that churches locating in downtown
areas might circumscribe those wishing to sell alcohol or pornography justified the exclusion of small
church from the downtown zoning district).
378 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
37 Id. at 430-431, n. 6.
380 See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977).

